19 february 2008

For the 419 Advance Fee Fraud Statistics 2009 click here

419 Advance Fee Fraud (2007)

Money For Free Is Big Business

The World s Most Successful Scam

 

 

Highest Losses

- Over 32 billion US$ to date, 4.3 billion in 2007

 

Highest Number of Organized Perpetrators

- Over 300,000 globally. Growing 3% per annum, faster then ever!

 

Highest Number of Victims

- Millions of people have incurred a loss to 419 AFF

 

No priority with authorities

- Talk is cheap; inadequate funding for anti e-cyber crime efforts

Rizomatic dynamics

- The roots of E- Cyber Crime networks

 

 

2007 Recorded and analysed by the 419 Unit

of Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

3 Shocking numbers on 419 Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud A fast growing multinational industry. In 69 countries

3 No reliable statistics on 419 Advance Fraud.

Check fraud

Lottery scams

Non delivery fraud and auction fraud

Last will, testament, inheritance scam

4 Centralized counter-419 operations

4 The AFF statistics by the 419unit@ultrascan.nl

4 What’s different with our numbers?

4 What is not different with our numbers?

5 What is the situation - what should be done?

5 419 AFF Spam

5 Misunderstandings on 419 AFF

  1. check and lottery fraud

6 Phishing

7 Developments during 2007

7 Money laundering and money mules

8 Talk is cheap; inadequate funding for anti e-cyber crime efforts.

8 Rizomatic dynamics of E- Cyber Crime networks
9-10 country specifics……

11 Scammers and scamrings on record

AFF resident active scam rings on record

Individual members of AFF scam rings on record

12 419 AFF low estimates

Total active resident AFF scammers

Profits before sharing with other scamrings

Profits after sharing with other scamrings

AFF losses suffered by companies and persons

12 Global Top 10 419 AFF loss

13 European Top 10 419 AFF loss

13 Top 10 estimated residing 419 AFF perpetrators

14 TOP 10 LOSSES, TOP 10 PROFITS

15 Fake company websites, money mules, bankruptcies, loss of career, home, victims prosecuted

bankruptcies caused by 419 AFF (on record)

loss of careers or jobs caused by 419 AFF (on record)

loss of home caused by AFF

AFF victims! prosecuted for fraud (on record)

16 Top 10 Money Mules

Low estimates for period April 1996 - December 2006

bankruptcies caused by 419

loss of careers caused by 419 AFF

loss of home caused by AFF AFF victims!

prosecuted for another fraud caused by AFF

AFF victims that went from savings to serious debt problems

18 Recorded* at some point between April 1996 and January 2007

Suicides AFF victims

murders related to 419 AFF

kidnappings or taken hostage connected to 419 AFF

Key positions held by AFF scam ring

Key ownership connected to AFF

AFF scam ring bosses financing political change in Nigeria

    1. explanations with the records* and estimates

24 17475 complaints from 161 countries

26 Do you recognize these 419 Advance Fee Fraud scams

27 Spam (off topic controversy)

Shocking numbers on

419 Nigerian Advance Fee Frauds

A fast growing multinational industry.

 

The Nigerian 419 Advance Fee Fraud came to the attention of the public and regulators during the 1970s over letters generally aimed at small businesses purporting to come from figures in the Nigerian government (often the Central Bank or Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) wanting help disposing of new oil wealth. Those letters were posted in Africa and Europe. In 2002 the US Department of Justice gained a court order to open every item of mail from Nigeria passing through JFK airport in New York, with around 70% involving scam offers. Russell Smith notes that between August and November 1998 Australia Post confiscated 4.5 tonnes of advance fee correspondence (1.8 million items) that had counterfeit postage. The 1980s and 1990s saw the scammers move from print to fax messaging followed by several explosions of email at the end of the millennium and in 2003, with the scammers spamming recipients in advanced economies (primarily those in English-speaking nations). The addressing of that email was indiscriminate, encompassing organisations and personal addresses. Today a mix of all the following approaches is used by the fast growing AFF scam rings based around the globe:

Mail

Fax

Phone

E-mail

Chat rooms

Dating web sites

Matchmaking web sites

Internet auction sites

Social and business networking sites

Mobile phone SMS

Internet phone

Internet gaming (new)

Personal introduction

Call centre / boiler-room

Door-to-door - in countries were an internet connection or sometimes phone or fax connections are not yet common circumstances.

There are No reliable statistics on 419 Advance Fraud.

Centralized counter-419 operations are the only way that viable statistics on 419 can be maintained. Decentralized counter-419 operations mean fragmented information and data.  Everyone has a piece of the picture, but no one has the full picture. Something has to change.

The internet, cyber crime, and other variations of fraud statistics from many countries have separate categories: auction fraud, non-delivery, credit-debit card fraud, check fraud, confidence fraud, lottery fraud, Nigerian letter fraud, etc.

There are many names for different crimes and many places for victims to report the crime and the governments to collect different crime statistics and solutions. An AFF, check fraud or lottery victim in the U.S. can choose to file his complaint with at least 3 different so-called centralized and/or specialized points of reception. The problem is similar in other countries.

Check fraud

Of all check fraud reported, over 80% is Nigerian advance fee fraud related.

Of all counterfeit checks intercepted by law enforcement, 76% (global 2007) was found on, sent or received by a Nigerian 419 advance fee fraudster.

3 major production centres for counterfeit checks in Nigeria, India and Canada are either under control of AFF organizations or have their largest client base with AFF.

Lottery scams

95% of all lottery scams are Nigerian 419 AFF based, the rest are usually less sophisticated. Lottery scam mailing - 4% of the recipients react of which 2.5% pays one or more advance fees.

Non delivery fraud and auction fraud

We have not analyzed enough raw data to state a percentage but we believe that the majority of those frauds are 419 AFF based. Two of our indicators are that 90% of fake sales and auction websites are 419 AFF based. 97% of the non-delivery/auction fraud that we reviewed were Nigerian 419 AFF based.

Last will, testament, inheritance scam

91% are perpetrated by Nigerian 419 AFF organisations.

Many other fraud categories are perpetrated by Nigerian 419 AFF organisations, not just Nigerian letter fraud.

Centralized counter-419 operations are the best way to assure an efficient, organized pool of contact data for the public in reporting 419 attempts and losses.  Reporting must be kept as simple for the public as possible, to encourage maximum reports. Only by encouraging maximum reporting can the best statistics and information be generated on 419 activities.

Having the best information possible is essential for accurately estimating the size of the problem and analyzing trends of 419 activities.

The AFF statistics by the 419unit@ultrascan.nl

What’s different with our numbers?

- We investigate what 419 AFF scammers do. We do not wait for victims to file a complaint. Many victims do not report the crime at all, as it is often the biggest mistake of their lives.

- The numbers are based on our investigations from 1996 till now, but mainly recent from March 2003 to December 31 2007.

The information that we collect and analyse:

- Scam proposals via internet, fax and phone through our robots for reception and response in 69 countries.

- Complaints of victims that contact the 419 Unit for assistance.

- Communications from perpetrators with victims and perpetrators with perpetrators.

- A small number of Police reports and court decisions.

More then 31,098 scammers, outside Nigeria and excluding “money mulesâ€, have been identified since March 2003, of which 7,336 have been monitored and reported to the authorities in the countries where they were residing.

The 419 Unit of Ultrascan is not an official reporting centre however in 2007 we did review 17475 complaints concerning Nigerian 419 advance fee fraud coming from 161 countries

- Our estimates are based on our records analysed and prepared by 419 AFF experts.

- We investigate and follow volatility and trends of AFF.

- Profile fraud victims - perpetrators and their Modus Operandi.

What is not different with our numbers?

- Our numbers do not show the complete AFF situation in the world, not even in one specific country.

- Our estimates are low, and for some countries probably extremely low. (We will not give estimates if we have no records of our own)

- We have substantial evidence that 95% of the lottery scams and 88% of check fraud are Nigerian AFF related. 76% of counterfeit checks that were found during transport were in possession of a Nigerian. Most counterfeit checks were produced in Nigeria, Canada and India of which a significant number under control of Nigerian AFF.

What is the situation - what should be done?

- The majority of Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud is still organized by Nigerians, but no longer initially from Nigeria. A minimum of 31,098 perpetrate their crime from 69 other countries and at least 250,000 from Nigeria.

- In some countries Law enforcement departments are attempting to curb the menace with publicity about local 419 scams and examples to warn the public.

It is a worthwhile attempt to educate people and prevent 419 cases.

-Other attempts targeting the communication methods/resources of the scammers have been done before and are successful for a couple of days or weeks.

- Its obvious that law enforcements feeble attempts to control this fraud have failed, as evidenced by 3 decades exponential 419 AFF growth.

- It’s our opinion that you cannot win this battle with only education or attacking the communication lines of 419 AFF scammers. It will prove to be only another easy lesson for the scammers. To effectively address the global 419 AFF problem the scammers have to be addressed as much as possible in person! This includes the young wannabe scammers and their parents in Nigeria.

- What we have on record is the tip of the iceberg of a rapidly growing and insidious threat to the global economy, undermining trust and mercilessly exploiting humans for financial gain.

- There is evidence of a terrorist connection in the slipstream of 419 networks, supporting future attacks, so the AFF scams have been escalated to a matter of utmost concern.

- Direct cooperation between law enforcement from the victim's home country and the scammer's working country is a decided advantage.

- Centralized 419 reporting and counter-419 operations in countries with a high AFF activity are essential!

419 AFF Spam

419 frauds SPAM tripled in volume and the change to targeted e-mail messages has caused concern among law enforcement agencies.

419 AFF proposals through spam, in most cases this is arranged from within the organisation itself, the harvesting of email addresses and the sending of spam. Some organisations have specialized associates that only spam, but the most successful 419 organizations do the harvesting of email/fax/phone/messenger ID’s themselves to be able to target specific groups and pay a professional spammer to distribute the scam proposals. 419 AFF is no cyber crime. It is a mainly a confidence fraud using all communication resources available.

Misunderstandings on 419 AFF

Most check and lottery fraud are Nigerian 419 AFF.

1. Lottery fraud (95% Nigerian advance fee scammers)

2. Check fraud (76% Nigerian advance fee scammers)

3. 419 advance fee fraud (97% Nigerian advance fee scammers)

4. Phishing. (5% Nigerian advance fee scammers)
Nigerian 419 AFF organisations are usually not in to “phishing†and are not planning it, as they don’t need to. It doesn’t fit their organisational structure and they have other means and methods to get access to the victims ID and money. 95% of Phishing is done to get bank account access details via email, phone or fake web sites. Nigerian AFF scammers are using fake company web sites to advertise products that are never delivered and/or create credibility with their victims when assuming the identity of a bank, finance or transport company.

If you have questions about our numbers please send an email to stats419unit@ultrascan.nl

For general questions about 419 Advance Fee Fraud please first take a look at the website of The 419 coalition http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/index.htm

or Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations http://www.ultrascan.nl/html/419_advance_fee_fraud.html

Please do not call us for information before you have introduced yourself in an email or fax.

Developments during 2007

Caller ID theft/spoof

Internet phones or cell phones hacked to show calls as coming from European and US numbers even though they originate from Nigeria.

Fraud web sites

In 2007 the number of fake company and phishing websites almost doubled from 23000 to 44000 on record. Is this a responsibility for providers to take action and clean up their image?

At the end of 2007 there was an average of 1500 fake company websites registered per week, of which every week we registered 120 bogus financial services companies

The websites are registered with false or stolen ID.

Money mules

A “Money mule†is someone who allows his or her bank account to be used for the transfer of illegal funds for a small commission.

419 AFF comes in many forms. In all cases, money needs to be funnelled back to the scammers in a way that will hide its origins. To this end, the scammers recruit often unsuspecting people.

The offer comes in the form of someone being an agent for a company or a freelance job, collecting payments and sending them.

The problem is that many people do not see this as a crime. After all, they think, I am just offering a service for which I am getting paid.

By using many of those money mules, the effect is distributed over many individuals making it hard for law enforcement to trace it.

Banks should be able to filter transactions of their customers in order to protect them from becoming a “money muleâ€.

Money laundering

The dollar is still the main scam currency, but there is a significant trend to Asian currencies and the Euro.

Money laundering takes place on all levels of these cross border crime organizations.

-On the ground level the routine is noticeably through money mules and cash transfers.

-The second level mainly by investments in real estate markets in the fast growing economies. (Examples are Shanghai and Dubai)

-The third level still shows the use of airlines and tickets to launder and transfer ill-gotten profits.

-On the top-level of international crime syndicates, money laundering, transfers and tax evasion takes place through “the minute system†when minutes of Satellite, mobile and broadband phone are the international means to launder money to practically every country in the world.

-Ownership in banks is a way for crime to control normal businesses. We found significance in overcapitalized banks, in countries that join(ed) the EU or (for example Nigeria) that returned to the international business and banking community when it was taken of the FATF list.

E - Cyber crime units in many countries, that suppose to handle 419 AFF, are planned or working but all are understaffed, not qualified, insufficiently funded, under equipped, not right positioned, hardworking staff is underpaid, with some of the units that the media tells us exist, it’s a tiring hassle for a normal person to find them and at moments some e-crime units cannot be reached. (Phones are not answered and email bounces)

We have asked a mix of over a thousand interested members of the public, victims and perpetrators that followed, or had to deal with, the anti-e-crime efforts in past years. They see e-crime units as black holes, nothing more then hoaxes paid for by governments to simulate public safety in the real and virtual world. In 2007 those units did not have significant results that could be noticed by victims, the public and more important, criminal perpetrators.

In the world of cyber-crime the officers and analysts we have dealt with are more interested in the scientific aspect of the work and the compilation of a generic report in years to come as opposed to having any impact on the criminal activity.

In a nutshell there are few practitioners in the world of cyber-crime investigation and efforts still not have significant tactical or strategic input with local or federal law enforcement.

Talk is cheap; inadequate funding for anti e-cyber crime efforts.

Proposals for possible effective efforts get in to a downwards red tape spiral and still are dismissed, or priority is played down. Every bit of information is translated to the perception level and threat assessments of (ignorant?) decision makers; at best they try to fit/bury it into existing limited resources of their department. In contrast with over a billion people, the majority of businesses and most criminal organisations that already use E-cyber space.

As a comparison, when government and politicians are asked to set priorities with an effective budget, it’s the last item on the list, assigned with “a guarantee to fail budgetâ€, for which you cannot even make a decent threat assessment or a not to boring internet game for 15 year olds.

Meanwhile the authorities argue about who should participate and which department or NGO should part with some of their budget in favour of funding a tiny e-crime unit. Don’t worry this ignorant and old structure approach is exactly the road to failure against rizomatic crime networks.

It seems a structural problem that “cyber crime†(networks) attracts departments with conflicting responsibilities. Those departments would like to have “the responsibility†at least for the part that they “understandâ€. Because not one is on itself qualified to grasp or handle the complexity of the matter; for example the E, Cyber and Crime components. At best it results in different departments attacking the different branches of the cyber crime tree, but not the roots.

Cyber-crime may be important when terrorism is involved but the current focus will result in a too late remedy, can we wait for that moment? Or do we lift issues to a higher level now?

The rizomatic roots of E- Cyber Crime networks.

Of course all businesses, including cyber crime, are dynamic and it is necessary to adapt. But adapt to what?

Consider the roots of E- Cyber Crime networks have rizomatic dynamics: resisting, contaminating, and vitalizing what has been established, integrating unknown actors and open sourced adaptive. No linear growth or (common) organizational structure.

The only guarantee one gets when cutting a head of these “new†criminal networks, is that there are more new heads popping up in (until recent) unpredictable shapes and places.

Media campaign’s to warn and educate the public, procedures to protect and change infrastructure, new laws and regulations or arresting a hundred or a thousand obvious perpetrators is positive action, but does not stop the growth and effectiveness of those rizomatic criminal networks, they adapt faster, their decision cycles are significantly shorter and they get better.

Do you believe that a government or one of its agencies can/will help you when you’re victim of what’s known as cross border e-crime, cyber crime, internet crime? Will there be cyber crime war departments in 10 years?

Greece has doubled its AFF out and input and became a European banking centre for Nigerian AFF. Almost all Greek banks have at least 210 bank accounts used to receive transfers of 419 AFF victims. 419 AFF perpetrators have key ownerships and key positions*. There is no centralized 419 reporting.

The 419 AFF organizations have recruited more low cost locals, mainly in Romania. Among young people that want to work in another country, in Spain among African refugees and China to do their front store work like opening bank accounts, registering companies with the chamber of commerce and receiving money transfers, in 2007 have read more about locals arrested for AFF, in 2008 this will become mainstream when prosecuting AFF, while the 419 AFF organisations stay aloof. There is no centralized 419 reporting.

In the Netherlands we have seen overall a slightly improved situation. Only a 15% rise of 419 scams email containing Dutch contact details. On the other hand, more websites, normal mail, dating and job scams with Dutch contact details. More complaints from victims, which could mean people, are less reluctant to report when they are scammed as before. In 2007 we registered a 70% decline in the use of Dutch company bank accounts by 419 scammers. But a steep rise in money mules.

The federal police project Apollo that started on October 10 2006 ended October 10 2007. It investigated the possibilities for change in Dutch infrastructure, rules, regulations and law, to make the Netherlands less attractive for West African Fraud Crime Networks. During the effort 125 perpetrators were arrested.

2008 could be a turning point if project Apollo is continued in to a new structure. However it seems that Dutch authorities let the ball drop, and with that the knowledge base collected by the Apollo project. There is no centralized reporting

The federal police project Apollo can be considered as an exemplary “best structural effortâ€. Other countries with 419 fraud problems are suggested to copy this effort.

In the U.K. police action against 419 AFF came almost to a halt. The only structured attempt is a small Fraud Alert unit in London. The set up of a new national co-ordination E-crime unit is currently pending Home Office approval for funding – a typical example of the very slow decision cycles with the authorities - when the largest criminal networks influence most of the internet financial activity – by the time that the authorities react, the crime networks have already anticipated - private sector investment could be necessary.

Japan has almost no 419ers that work there, compared to the high losses of Japanese AFF victims. But it has the exclusive to a very successful extension of the 419 scam which is specifically tuned to Japanese victims. The victims are blackmailed after they realise that they have been scammed. The scammers threaten the victims with telling there colleagues, friends and family that they have been scammed, if the victim doesn’t keep paying fees. There is a surge in scam activity focussed on this “shame scamâ€, it seems to work even if a victim is initially scammed for a small amount like $50.

Chiba prefectural police have confirmed about 1.3 billion yen from abroad was deposited in about 100 accounts opened by the suspects.

Prefectural police launched a joint investigation with Saitama prefectural police to crack a money laundering scheme run by another Nigerian using the same method to launder money for syndicates outside Japan.

Remitting money to Japan is easy because identification and other security procedures are less strict compared with the West.

The Japanese effort is considered a “best hands on†effort

In Canada there is a high number of Nigerian 419ers. Most of those are perpetrating the whole range of 419 crimes and service other scamrings around the globe. There is a high professionalism among the leaders of the Canadian 419 scamrings, they have built their business and extended it in to the normal business community. There are links to other international organized crime groups and profits are in some cases laundered through foreign banks in which they have a key ownership. In Canada victims of Nigerian AFF can report with “Phone Busters†fraud prevention and reporting centre.

Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia has become a centre for 419 AFF; we noticed an increase in the number of scammers deployed there from Europe, Canada and West Africa. Reports from Asia, mainly New Zealand, Australia and Vietnam but also from the US, show an increase of victims whose defrauded moneys are laundered via banks in Malaysia.

In the U.S. the authorities put their effort in prosecuting check fraud victims and unwary money mules, and a media campaign that obviously doesn’t work. There was a minimal effort in international law enforcement cooperation in contrast with the large number of U.S. victims. There still is no centralized reporting with significant results.

More country specific information available on valid request.

419Unit release February 19 2008

 

on our records*

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

 

AFF resident active scam rings 2007

2006

2005

individual members of AFF scam rings 2007

2006

2005

Argentina

 

1

 

 

3

3

 

Australia

 

8

5

2

39

23

12

Austria

 

2

2

2

50

51

62

Belgium

 

7

4

3

159

81

72

Bolivia

 

1

 

 

9

 

 

Brazil**

 

4

3

 

33

24

 

Bulgaria

 

2

1

1

33

21

32

Cameroon

 

3

 

 

34

 

 

Canada***

 

6

5

5

118

62

79

Chile

 

 

 

 

2

 

 

China**

 

20

12

2

521

178

73

Colombia

 

1

1

 

3

3

 

Croatia

 

 

 

 

2

1

 

Cyprus

 

2

2

1

5

5

2

Denmark

 

3

2

2

41

25

26

Dubai

 

7

5

2

99

18

2

Egypt

 

4

4

2

26

19

15

Finland

 

2

1

1

11

6

5

France**

 

11

9

7

352

312

127

Gambia

 

 

 

 

5

4

 

Germany

 

12

9

10

389

311

275

Ghana**

 

24

16

4

577

283

124

Greece**

 

10

12

4

152

192

155

Hong Kong **

 

3

2

 

17

12

 

Hungary**

 

2

2

2

14

18

16

India**

 

8

7

3

324

107

79

Indonesia

 

2

1

 

15

6

 

Iran

 

1

 

 

5

2

 

Iraq

 

1

2

 

10

11

 

Ireland

 

8

7

6

131

128

117

Israel

 

2

2

 

5

3

 

Italy**

 

17

15

8

332

209

149

Japan

 

3

2

1

9

5

2

Kenya **

 

5

3

 

73

8

 

Korea, Republic of

 

7

5

 

52

31

 

Kuwait

 

1

1

 

8

6

 

Libya

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Lithuania

 

3

2

1

11

5

3

Luxembourg

 

 

 

 

2

1

1

Malaysia**

 

7

5

2

125

53

51

Malta

 

1

1

1

7

4

2

Mauritius

 

 

 

 

1

1

 

Mexico

 

2

1

 

5

2

 

Morocco

 

 

 

 

2

2

 

Netherlands

 

14

17

24

611

777

802

Netherlands Antilles

 

1

 

 

6

 

 

New Zealand

 

1

0

 

3

1

 

Pakistan

 

1

1

 

5

4

 

Palestinian Territory

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Philipines

 

4

4

 

12

13

 

Poland

 

3

2

2

12

7

11

Portugal**

 

5

3

3

41

26

24

Romania**

 

5

5

2

22

26

19

Russia

 

2

1

 

22

12

 

Saudi Arabia

 

 

1

 

4

4

 

Senegal

 

1

 

 

2

 

 

Singapore

 

5

3

 

26

6

 

Slovenia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

South Africa

 

8

7

3

216

173

177

Spain

 

24

22

18

913

765

561

Sweden

 

3

2

3

16

9

11

Switzerland

 

7

5

3

83

12

7

Taiwan

 

3

3

 

16

12

 

Thailand**

 

5

2

3

129

29

31

Tjech Republic**

 

2

2

2

11

13

9

Turkey**

 

5

3

3

31

9

5

United Kingdom

 

23

19

20

719

713

724

United States**

 

21

15

8

302

233

271

Yugoslavia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

other countries**** excl. Nigeria

 

17

12

36

321

310

272

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Totals

 

363

280

202

7336

5390

4405

**

- Growing 419 AFF activity

***

- After a decline renewed 419 AFF growth expected.

****

- Other countries (excl. Nigeria) with a fast 419 AFF activity growth.

In Nigeria there are too many 419 rings and 419ers to enumerate and quantify losses to victims worldwide.

*(our record) = numbers established through investigations by the 419 unit of Ultrascan and/or confirmed from open source. Our investigations are focused on countries with a high AFF victim/loss count excluding Nigeria itself and most of South-America.

 

419Unit release Februari 19 2008

419 AFF low estimates for 20072006 &2005

 

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

total active resident AFF scammers 2007

2006

profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US$

2006

profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US$

2006

AFF losses suffered in 2007 by companies and persons in million US$

2006

2005

Argentina

25

 

0,25

 

0,10

0,00

2,70

2,5

 

Australia

275

220

52

34

34,84

23,12

166,00

125

92

Austria

105

110

19

22

16,15

18,92

3,00

5

8

Belgium

390

300

71

43

51,12

31,39

79,0

51

70

Bolivia

19

 

0,9

 

0,36

0,00

0,10

1,1

 

Brazil**

70

60

22,5

21

17,10

16,17

22,00

16

 

Bulgaria

45

35

1,7

1

1,17

0,69

1,40

0,6

0,3

Cameroon

130

 

0,45

 

0,16

0,00

0,10

0,15

 

Canada***

3310

3120

460

420

312,80

289,80

158,00

150

172

Chile

 

 

0,1

 

0,04

0,00

0,21

0,12

 

China**

3500

2900

530

404

180,20

141,40

205,00

115

20

Colombia

10

12

0,3

0,6

0,09

0,18

5,60

1,3

 

Croatia

9

 

0,165

 

0,04

0,00

0,70

0,11

 

Cyprus

9

7

30,2

0,9

23,86

0,72

1,10

0,7

0,6

Denmark

75

39

22

16

15,84

11,68

8,2

7

7

Dubai

132

70

156

161

124,80

130,41

81,00

45

1,3

Egypt

75

52

25

31

20,50

25,11

27,00

32

28

Finland

21

17

2,3

0,8

2,07

0,73

4,10

2

3

France**

590

515

155

166

69,75

73,04

235,0

192

130

Gambia

30

 

0,25

 

0,06

0,00

1,20

3,2

 

Germany

1455

1210

318

215

174,90

117,18

280,0

221

210

Ghana**

2410

1690

92

66

56,12

39,60

3,30

1,7

0,4

Greece**

190

210

344

389

216,72

241,18

12,00

53

11

Hong Kong **

38

17

81

66

55,08

45,54

35,00

32

 

Hungary**

50

50

4,8

5

4,13

4,35

1,30

2,7

1,2

India**

510

190

85

26

45,90

14,30

52,00

32

3,5

Indonesia

38

20

19

16

5,51

4,80

7,00

4,5

 

Iran

15

 

10,5

 

3,36

0,00

2,50

1,7

 

Iraq

30

28

16

60

3,52

12,60

0,25

2,1

 

Ireland

170

145

109

93

63,22

54,87

57,0

35

45

Israel

15

10

3,6

3

1,98

1,62

2,40

11

 

Italy**

830

610

276

204

129,72

97,92

159,0

115

120

Japan

35

8

102

17

90,78

14,96

270,00

350

320

Kenya **

170

30

7

3

3,36

1,47

5,00

3

 

Korea, Republic of

104

45

76

70

28,88

25,90

72,00

63

 

Kuwait

25

 

0,8

3,2

0,24

0,93

4,20

0,6

 

Libya

5

 

0,5

 

0,15

0,00

0,30

0,04

 

Lithuania

15

7

71

33

31,24

14,85

2,90

0,6

0,7

Luxembourg

3

3

 

23

0,00

18,40

0,6

6

3

Malaysia**

260

85

21

7

17,22

5,81

17,00

15

11

Malta

10

2

11

9

4,07

3,42

0,35

0,1

0,07

Mauritius

2

 

1,2

0

0,50

0,00

 

0,1

 

Mexico

20

15

28

40

9,52

14,00

12,00

17

 

Morocco

 

 

0,1

 

0,03

0,00

3,00

0,2

 

Netherlands

1281

1552

302

386

108,72

135,10

83,0

79

72

Netherlands Antilles

17

 

10,3

 

3,61

0,00

0,80

0,35

 

New Zealand

7

1

3,2

0

1,57

0,00

4,10

6,5

 

Pakistan

15

 

0,25

0

0,10

0,00

1,50

0,3

 

Palestinian Territory

1

 

 

0

0,00

0,00

0,10

2

 

Philipines

35

35

51

67

39,78

51,59

1,30

3

 

Poland

33

20

7

3

4,97

2,10

5,60

4

1,7

Portugal**

75

50

18,5

9,5

12,40

6,46

19,00

13

12

Romania**

61

62

24

18

15,12

11,52

6,80

3,5

0,8

Russia

35

25

103

72

32,96

23,76

46,00

3,7

 

Saudi Arabia

10

10

3,5

12

1,51

5,04

11,00

17

 

Senegal

31

 

0,07

 

0,02

0,00

0,06

0,09

 

Singapore

60

20

51

32

21,42

13,76

7,00

3,5

 

Slovenia

 

 

 

 

0,00

0,00

0,05

0,03

 

South Africa

1550

1250

117

115

47,97

48,30

105,00

116

136

Spain

3140

2840

373

269

145,47

102,22

355,00

350

320

Sweden

36

29

17

7

6,46

2,59

11,00

26

26

Switzerland

285

115

279

88

220,41

68,64

130,00

160

102

Taiwan

50

37

17

62

4,59

16,12

2,90

2,2

 

Thailand**

310

110

79

33

50,56

21,45

28,00

19

1,1

Tjech Republic**

21

22

5

7

4,10

5,81

6,00

10,5

9

Turkey**

105

110

72

17

61,92

14,79

55,00

26

5

United Kingdom

2520

2120

486

377

199,26

158,34

580,0

530

520

United States**

6200

3500

712

378

113,92

64,26

830,00

790

720

Yugoslavia

 

 

 

 

0,00

0,00

 

0,45

 

other countries**** excl. Nigeria

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Totals

31098

23740

5957

4622

2914

2249

4290

3883

3184

 

TOP 10 Active Resident Scammers

 

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

total active resident AFF scammers 2007

2006

Canada***

3310

3120

China**

3500

2900

Germany

1455

1210

Ghana**

2410

1690

Italy**

830

610

Netherlands

1281

1552

South Africa

1550

1250

Spain

3140

2840

United Kingdom

2520

2120

United States**

6200

3500


TOP 10 LOSSES

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

total active resident AFF scammers 2007

2006

profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US$

2006

profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US$

2006

AFF losses suffered in 2007 by companies and persons in million US$

Canada***

3310

3120

460

420

312,80

289,80

158,00

Italy**

830

610

276

204

129,72

97,92

159,0

Australia

275

220

52

34

34,84

23,12

166,00

China**

3500

2900

530

404

180,20

141,40

205,00

France**

590

515

155

166

69,75

73,04

235,0

Japan

35

8

102

17

90,78

14,96

270,00

Germany

1455

1210

318

215

174,90

117,18

280,0

Spain

3140

2840

373

269

145,47

102,22

355,00

United Kingdom

2520

2120

486

377

199,26

158,34

580,0

United States**

6200

3500

712

378

113,92

64,26

830,00

 

TOP 10 PROFITS

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

total active resident AFF scammers 2007

2006

profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US$

2006

profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US$

2006

AFF losses suffered in 2007 by companies and persons in million US$

Canada***

3310

3120

460

420

312,80

289,80

158,00

Italy**

830

610

276

204

129,72

97,92

159,0

China**

3500

2900

530

404

180,20

141,40

205,00

Greece**

190

210

344

389

216,72

241,18

12,00

Germany

1455

1210

318

215

174,90

117,18

280,0

Netherlands

1281

1552

302

386

108,72

135,10

83,0

Spain

3140

2840

373

269

145,47

102,22

355,00

Switzerland

285

115

279

88

220,41

68,64

130,00

United Kingdom

2520

2120

486

377

199,26

158,34

580,0

United States**

6200

3500

712

378

113,92

64,26

830,00

 

419Unit release February 19 2008

on our records*

on our records*

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

Money Mules x1000

Fake company websites used by scamrings in country

bankruptcies caused by 419 AFF

loss of careers or jobs caused by 419 AFF

loss of home caused by AFF

AFF victims! prosecuted for fraud

Argentina

1

31

1

 

 

 

Australia

42

112

6

6

3

7

Austria

1

27

3

10

1

1

Belgium

32

72

8

11

6

6

Bolivia

3

3

1

 

 

1

Brazil**

5

23

 

32

5

3

Bulgaria

14

7

 

1

2

1

Cameroon

2

55

 

1

1

 

Canada***

12

1711

3

38

4

9

Chile

0,45

16

 

 

 

 

China**

80

767

7

8

4

3

Colombia

6

3

 

 

 

 

Croatia

0,12

3

 

 

 

 

Cyprus

0,08

5

 

1

 

 

Denmark

6

18

5

28

3

2

Dubai

26

6

 

3

 

 

Egypt

2

14

4

255

2

3

Finland

0,6

3

 

 

 

 

France**

6

211

3

23

10

5

Gambia

0,6

3

 

 

 

 

Germany

85

152

9

21

7

8

Ghana**

9

86

 

5

 

4

Greece**

2

26

11

92

3

5

Hong Kong **

15

91

1

 

 

1

Hungary**

3

17

1

3

1

2

India**

211

242

2

23

6

5

Indonesia

3

45

5

3

3

1

Iran

1

16

1

2

1

 

Iraq

6

2

 

9

 

 

Ireland

7

25

3

2

5

2

Israel

2

6

 

1

 

 

Italy**

129

521

8

36

8

5

Japan

1

7

3

7

32

 

Kenya **

2

5

 

 

 

1

Korea, Republic of

10

7

2

3

 

 

Kuwait

2

5

 

3

 

1

Libya

1

2

 

 

 

 

Lithuania

1

5

 

1

 

 

Luxembourg

1

3

 

2

 

5

Malaysia**

5

201

3

7

3

1

Malta

0,05

 

 

1

 

 

Mauritius

0,21

3

 

 

 

 

Mexico

 

15

2

2

1

 

Morocco

7

10

 

 

 

 

Netherlands

53

3301

8

38

9

17

Netherlands Antilles

6

2

 

1

 

1

New Zealand

1

21

1

 

 

1

Pakistan

6

15

 

 

2

 

Palestinian Territory

1

0

 

 

 

 

Philipines

3

39

3

3

3

 

Poland

7

6

1

3

 

 

Portugal**

1

8

6

2

1

1

Romania**

18

142

1

3

2

 

Russia

33

377

1

72

5

3

Saudi Arabia

0,17

2

 

1

 

 

Senegal

3

38

 

 

1

 

Singapore

2

63

1

 

1

2

Slovenia

3

20

 

1

 

 

South Africa

21

219

5

58

3

5

Spain

101

2822

8

78

5

5

Sweden

0,9

11

2

2

1

3

Switzerland

6

255

4

7

2

9

Taiwan

9

42

 

1

1

1

Thailand**

9

30

 

2

1

3

Tjech Republic**

3

56

6

15

2

3

Turkey**

10

8

3

5

3

3

United Kingdom

259

8521

61

73

17

36

United States**

710

2886

312

352

71

56

Yugoslavia

4

2

 

1

1

 

other countries**** excl. Nigeria

1380

20150

2

392

5

5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Totals

3393,18

43618

517

1750

247

236

 

TOP 10 Money Mules

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

Money Mule accounts x1000

Australia

42

China**

80

Germany

85

India**

211

Italy**

129

Netherlands

53

Spain

101

United Kingdom

259

United States**

710

other countries**** excl. Nigeria

1380

 

 

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

 

bankruptcies caused by 419

loss of careers caused by 419 AFF

loss of home caused by AFF

AFF victims! prosecuted for another fraud caused by AFF

AFF victims that went from savings to serious debt problems

Argentina

 

 

 

 

 

 

Australia

 

550

80

90

530

8000

Austria

 

20

 

20

110

7000

Belgium

 

20

62

25

30

3500

Bolivia

 

 

 

 

 

30

Brazil**

 

 

100

 

 

1500

Bulgaria

 

 

3

 

 

 

Cameroon

 

 

 

 

 

 

Canada***

 

1550

9000

1100

310

23000

Chile

 

 

 

 

 

 

China**

 

270

 

30

 

12000

Colombia

 

 

 

 

 

 

Croatia

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cyprus

 

 

 

 

 

 

Denmark

 

15

35

42

15

12000

Dubai

 

 

 

 

20

150

Egypt

 

30

25

 

35

930

Finland

 

 

 

 

 

 

France**

 

113

960

116

135

12600

Gambia

 

 

 

 

 

 

Germany

 

122

4600

119

167

16200

Ghana**

 

 

10

 

 

60

Greece**

 

25

55

10

10

500

Hong Kong **

 

 

 

 

120

300

Hungary**

 

 

40

10

20

500

India**

 

10

500

90

 

5000

Indonesia

 

 

 

 

 

900

Iran

 

 

 

 

 

 

Iraq

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ireland

 

 

600

 

20

3200

Israel

 

 

 

5

 

 

Italy**

 

60

320

125

35

3500

Japan

 

 

350

 

 

11000

Kenya **

 

 

 

 

 

 

Korea, Republic of

 

 

 

 

 

350

Kuwait

 

 

 

 

 

 

Libya

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lithuania

 

 

 

10

 

 

Luxembourg

 

 

1

 

3

35

Malaysia**

 

120

30

150

300

4500

Malta

 

 

 

1

 

1

Mauritius

 

 

 

 

 

60

Mexico

 

 

 

 

 

150

Morocco

 

 

 

 

 

 

Netherlands

 

360

800

305

68

7000

Netherlands Antilles

 

 

 

 

 

 

New Zealand

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pakistan

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestinian Territory

 

 

 

 

 

30

Philipines

 

 

 

 

 

600

Poland

 

 

 

 

 

 

Portugal**

 

10

15

15

20

 

Romania**

 

 

50

 

 

1500

Russia

 

 

 

 

 

550

Saudi Arabia

 

 

 

 

 

 

Senegal

 

 

 

 

 

 

Singapore

 

 

 

 

 

 

Slovenia

 

 

 

 

 

 

South Africa

 

85

35

 

1200

3000

Spain

 

80

350

20

 

250

Sweden

 

60

10

30

300

6000

Switzerland

 

130

25

30

180

870

Taiwan

 

 

 

 

 

260

Thailand**

 

 

30

 

45

1500

Tjech Republic**

 

20

 

10

5

700

Turkey**

 

15

10

10

 

800

United Kingdom

 

1220

3500

840

1160

63000

United States**

 

8550

72000

9000

2030

350000

Yugoslavia

 

 

 

 

 

 

other countries**** excl. Nigeria

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Totals

 

13435

93596

12203

6868

563026

 

 

Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.

 

 

suicides AFF victims

murders related to 419 AFF

kidnappings or taken hostage connected to 419 AFF scam ring

Key positions held by AFF scam ring

Key ownership connected to AFF

AFF scam ring bosses financing political change in Nigeria

Argentina

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Australia

 

 

 

 

 

3

 

1

Austria

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

Belgium

 

 

 

 

2

83

2

3

Bolivia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brazil**

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bulgaria

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cameroon

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Canada***

 

 

1

3

1

7

7

2

Chile

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

China**

 

 

 

2

 

2

1

1

Colombia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Croatia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cyprus

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Denmark

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Dubai

 

 

 

 

 

1

2

1

Egypt

 

 

 

 

 

1

1

 

Finland

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

France**

 

 

1

1

 

5

3

1

Gambia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Germany

 

 

1

 

 

7

3

3

Ghana**

 

 

 

2

 

16

7

5

Greece**

 

 

 

 

 

3

3

2

Hong Kong **

 

 

 

 

1

15

1

1

Hungary**

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

India**

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

Indonesia

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

Iran

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Iraq

 

 

 

 

 

7

 

 

Ireland

 

 

 

 

 

18

 

5

Israel

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Italy**

 

 

 

 

 

2

5

2

Japan

 

 

5

 

 

 

 

 

Kenya **

 

 

 

 

 

3

1

 

Korea, Republic of

 

 

 

 

 

1

1

1

Kuwait

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Libya

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lithuania

 

 

 

 

 

2

2

1

Luxembourg

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Malaysia**

 

 

1

 

 

1

2

1

Malta

 

 

 

 

 

1

1

 

Mauritius

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mexico

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Morocco

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Netherlands

 

 

 

2

3

4

5

5

Netherlands Antilles

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New Zealand

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pakistan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Palestinian Territory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Philipines

 

 

 

 

 

1

1

1

Poland

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Portugal**

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Romania**

 

 

 

 

 

1

2

 

Russia

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Saudi Arabia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Senegal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Singapore

 

 

 

 

 

3

2

1

Slovenia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

South Africa

 

 

 

5

15

1

5

3

Spain

 

 

 

 

 

52

5

4

Sweden

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Switzerland

 

 

 

 

 

2

1

1

Taiwan

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Thailand**

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Tjech Republic**

 

 

 

1

 

2

 

1

Turkey**

 

 

 

 

 

1

2

 

United Kingdom

 

 

 

 

 

5

4

11

United States**

 

 

1

5

5

602

8

4

Yugoslavia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

other countries**** excl. Nigeria

 

 

 

3

8

3

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Totals

 

 

12

24

35

863

79

63

 

Explanations with the records* and estimates

AFF resident active scam rings

Advance Fee Fraud scamrings working from country A to scam victims in country B.

In general a 419 AFF scammer will not scam people in his home country. It’s one of the basic rules for the AFF scam to create distance and jurisdictions between him/her and the victim (target).

Individual members of AFF scam rings

Local AFF scam rings are groups of individual scammers with different tasks and training to perform the scam at hand, specifically adjusted to the victim’s state of mind and type of AFF scam.

Total active resident AFF scammers

Active resident scammers whom we have established the existence of at some point during an investigation, but we have not yet been able to identify the scamring they work with. We add them to the known members of scamrings to come to an estimate of the total number of scammers in a country

Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US$

These are the profits from scams performed by scamrings in one country. These profits are to be shared with scammers in other countries who provided victims or necessary services to expedite the scam. (Example: AFF scamrings based in The Netherlands built $368,000,000 US with the assistance from scammers in other countries)

Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US$

Profits from scams performed by scamrings in one country after sharing with scammers in other countries who supplied the victim or provided necessary services to perform the scam. The basic element of this scam is to share the profits as agreed upon. (Example- scamrings based in Belgium made a profit of more then $31,400,000 US. This does not mean this loot is still in Belgium)

AFF losses suffered in 2007 by companies and private citizens in million US$

These are the losses including all the real expenses incurred by the victims in the country itself. The advance fees are paid to scammers in other countries (example: Belgian victims lost over $51,000,000 US to foreign AFF scammers in 2006)

Victims very often sustain much more loss than the advance fees paid, such as emergency interest rates, fire sales of assets, lost friendships and even marriages.

(The psychological impact is more devastating to the victim than the financial impact, and the financial impact is catastrophic.)

Bankruptcies caused by 419 AFF

In some cases victims and/or their companies get so deep in debt to pay all the different advance fees that they are forced to file for bankruptcy.

We do not specifically log bankruptcies that occur during or after the 419 scam. Only the ones brought to our attention.

Loss of careers or jobs caused by 419 AFF

Many victims, whether professional or blue collar, lose their career and/or practice.

Many lose their job and are unaware that it is because of AFF. When companies fall victim to AFF, they must downsize or file for bankruptcy. Very often the victim still does believe the scammers or doesn’t want to go on the record as an AFF victim.

One example is a factory with 271 staff that went bankrupt because, after production began, management of the factory was convinced to advance fees to release a first down payment of $12,000,000 US. The complete contract value was for $42,000,000 US. The victim was shown in person the following convincing but counterfeit or stolen instruments: diplomatic passport, completion plans for an existing project of national importance, business, banking and government references from several Middle Eastern, Asian and European countries. And last but not least a bank account with a payment in favour of the victim accessible through internet banking on an exact copy of the website of a large Canadian bank. The victim received the account number and codes to access the bank account via internet banking. Only one problem: making transfers from the account failed.

The victim also visited the project and was received with an impressive governmental VIP reception. During his visit the victim met other contractors who were pleased with the project, everything appeared in order. The financial loss, excluding subcontractors was $9,000,000 US the company went bankrupt and the staff that lost their job think it’s because of bad market conditions and orders that were cancelled. We don’t know what happened to the subcontractors, we assume nothing good. We do know that the scammers involved only made a net profit of $1,200,000 US. Who cares about the difference between AFF profits and the real total damages?

Loss of home caused by AFF

In almost all countries we investigated, we were confronted with AFF victims that were evicted from their home by their landlord or the bank for defaulting on their mortgage.

We have found evidence of scammers being proud of the number of victims that lost their homes because of the skill of the scammer responsible. A high number AFF victim foreclosures is seen as an accomplishment by a majority of AFF scammers and also mentioned during some of the AFF training for new recruits.

AFF victims Prosecuted for fraud!

During the AFF scam, victims are very often threatened with the possibility of a government or international institution investigating their part in “the dealâ€. Example: tax evasion, money laundering or corrupting officials. This is to make sure that the victim will not involve his own government or other outsiders, whom he would normally trust and consult on “the dealâ€. Generally, victims have nothing to fear from such threats, they should fear being prosecuted in their own country for bank fraud after they received and cashed counterfeit checks or bogus wire transfers to their bank account.

For example: With cashier's check AFF, local authorities are usually trying to charge the victim with attempting to defraud their bank, or Nigeria, or someone, when in fact it is the AFF victim who is defrauded. Much time and energy is wasted by local authorities on such cases, which are eventually dismissed as they learn more about AFF.

Key positions held by resident members of a scam ring that we have recorded are with: postal services, banks, credit card organizations, insurance, transport, oil companies, embassies, hotels, airports, police, immigrations, academic hospitals, intelligence related companies and state departments.

Key ownership connected to AFF scamrings we have recorded in: banks, Western Union and Moneygram agencies, Internet cafes, customs clearing agents, car dealerships, and hotels

No 419 AFF problem in your country?

The 419 Unit of Ultrascan is not an official reporting centre however in 2007 we did review 17475 complaints concerning Nigerian 419 advance fee fraud coming from 161 countries

Albania

3

 

Kuwait

36

Algeria

15

 

Latvia

10

Andorra

1

 

Lebanon

20

Angola

3

 

Libya

6

Antigua and Barbuda

2

 

Lithuania

78

Argentina

61

 

Luxembourg

13

Armenia

3

 

Macao

1

Aruba

2

 

Macedonia

16

Australia

588

 

Madagascar

2

Austria

21

 

Malaysia

251

Azerbaijan

11

 

Maldives

1

Bahamas

6

 

Mali

2

Bahrain

12

 

Malta

6

Bangladesh

7

 

Mauritania

1

Barbados

2

 

Mauritius

77

Belarus

1

 

Mexico

144

Belgium

878

 

Micronesia

1

Benin

26

 

Moldova, Republic of

1

Bermuda

1

 

Monaco

9

Bhutan

1

 

Mongolia

3

Bolivia

52

 

Morocco

29

Bosnia and Herzegovina

119

 

Mozambique

5

Botswana

1

 

Namibia

3

Brazil

301

 

Netherlands

403

Brunei Darussalam

17

 

Netherlands Antilles

21

Bulgaria

169

 

New Zealand

91

Burkina Faso

2

 

Nicaragua

2

Cambodia

24

 

Nigeria

598

Cameroon

16

 

Norway

72

Canada

912

 

Oman

15

Cape Verde

1

 

Pakistan

43

Cayman Islands

1

 

Palestinian Territory

13

Chile

62

 

Panama

42

China

329

 

Papua New Guinea

1

Colombia

22

 

Paraguay

7

Costa Rica

1

 

Peru

25

Cote D'Ivoire

93

 

Philippines

81

Croatia

3

 

Poland

73

Cyprus

1

 

Portugal

29

Czech Republic

281

 

Puerto Rico

8

Denmark

31

 

Qatar

7

Dominican Republic

21

 

Romania

622

Ecuador

9

 

Russian Federation

637

Egypt

21

 

Rwanda

1

El Salvador

2

 

Saudi Arabia

72

Eritrea

1

 

Senegal

37

Estonia

15

 

Sierra Leone

2

Ethiopia

4

 

Singapore

32

Faroe Islands

1

 

Slovakia

9

Finland

82

 

Slovenia

26

France

1217

 

South Africa

356

Gabon

1

 

Spain

219

Gambia

22

 

Sri Lanka

17

Georgia

3

 

Sudan

3

Germany

1023

 

Sweden

126

Ghana

439

 

Switzerland

155

Gibraltar

1

 

Syria

7

Greece

241

 

Taiwan

41

Grenada

1

 

Tanzania

4

Guam

5

 

Thailand

92

Guatemala

11

 

Togo

21

Guinea

3

 

Trinidad and Tobago

4

Guinea-Bissau

2

 

Tunisia

26

Guyana

3

 

Turkey

237

Haiti

8

 

Uganda

2

Hong Kong

69

 

Ukraine

57

Hungary

32

 

United Arab Emirates

51

Iceland

3

 

United Kingdom

1593

India

153

 

United States

2477

Indonesia

125

 

 

0

Iran, Islamic Republic of

42

 

Uruguay

7

Iraq

5

 

Uzbekistan

3

Ireland

39

 

Vanuatu

1

Israel

31

 

Venezuela

17

Italy

162

 

Vietnam

63

Jamaica

31

 

Virgin Islands, British

1

Japan

151

 

Virgin Islands, U.S.

9

Jordan

2

 

Yemen

17

Kazakhstan

5

 

Yugoslavia

13

Kenya

35

 

Zambia

3

Korea, Republic of

62

 

Zimbabwe

4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total

17475

 

Do you recognize these 419 Advance Fee Fraud scams

Lottery scam

Counterfeit Postal draft scam

Over invoiced contract scam

eBay check (over) payment and refund scam

Unclaimed inheritance scam

Unclaimed bank account scam

Counterfeit Check scam

Dating-romance scam

Black (defaced) currency scam

Gold dust scam

Diamond scam

Fake bank scam

Housing scam

Anti-terrorist certificate scam

Disaster relief fund scam

Financial representative in your country scam

Work permit scam

Payment for art scam

Deceased next of kin scam

Construction sub contractor scam

Lower priced crude oil scam

SWIFT transfer scam

Antique export payments scam

University study place scam

Money from former ruler scam

Relative of holocaust victim scam

Identity theft

Jobs for professionals scam

Dead millionaire funds for charities or disaster relief scam

Very low interest loans for relatively small advance fees scam

Hotel bookings and refund

United Nations loan approval scam

Death threat scam

Spam (off topic controversy)

To everyone “who really wants to know†it must be obvious that most spam is arranged by professionals who want to make a lot of money or disrupt established structures for commercial, criminal or political reasons, and “amateur†or “niche†spammers that want to pick up some extra cash to survive every month.

Everyone that wants to spam, can try for them selves and be fairly successful within a single day or find and pay a professional or amateur spammer to do the job.

Spam filters are necessary, but by now we should be aware that it doesn’t solve problems created by intelligent humans that are focussed to find a hole in those filters.

The spam filters want to win a battle by using technical solutions against intelligent humans who only see spam filter methods as very interesting and entertaining but solvable problems. In spam quarters there is no higher honour then to penetrate a commercially built filter, so forget about winning that battle conclusively before the time arrives that people don’t use email anymore as a main communication.

There are about 300 hardcore professional spammers, and thousands of amateurs/copycats/ associates, that sell their services independently.

It would take; a newly started private or government backed Non Government Organization that focussed only on finding the professional spammers, approximately 6 months to ID and physically locate the first 100 key persons within that group including sufficient evidence. If acted upon by law enforcement, it would cut spam significantly at a fraction of the current cost and it would hurt at the basis where until now it is all fun and games.

In the lavatory of the 419 Unit there is the following tranquilizing quote on the inside of one of the doors:

-There is this space filled with communications of a billion people, only 20% is genuine, so what we do is filter the 80% spam (because we are advised that it is necessary, and the solutions are for sale) further we make regulations that make the genuine 20% of the communications difficult or illegal, but we do not address the extremely tiny group of people that ignore the regulations and are responsible for most of the problem and its growth.-