


PRE-Release 1.5 !



Smart People Easier To Scam

419 Advance Fee Fraud Statistics 2013



Monitored, on Recorded and analysed by the 419 Unit of Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

PRE-Release 1.5 Amsterdam

23 July, 2014

Smart People Easier To Scam

- High-achieving professionals are the most likely to be defrauded

419 Advance Fee Fraud

- Money For Free Is Big Business
- The World's Most Successful Scam

Highest Losses

- Over 82 billion US\$ to date, 12.7 billion in 2013

Highest Number of Organized Perpetrators

- Over 800,000 globally. Growing 5% per annum, faster than ever!
- In Nigeria: Too Many to Count!**

Highest Number of Victims

- Millions of people have incurred a loss to 419 Advance Fee Fraud

Centralized counter-419 operations

- Reporting must be kept as simple for the public as possible, to encourage maximum reports

419 Advance Fee Fraud moving to the east!

- Asia falling prey to new and classic Advance Fee Frauds

Money transfer agents conduits to rip people off

- A significant number of money transfer agencies are operated by criminal organizations

Rhizomatic dynamics

- The roots of E- Cyber Crime networks

Content

1. A fast growing multinational industry.	8
There are No reliable statistics on 419 Advance Fraud.	8
1.1. Check fraud.....	9
1.2. Lottery scams	9
1.3. Non delivery fraud and auction fraud	9
1.4. Centralized reporting.....	9
2. Victims categorized	10
2.1. Small loss	10
2.2. Medium loss	10
2.3. High loss	10
2.4. All victims	10
3. Smart people easier to scam	11
3.1. For the Bigger Scams Victims Need to Trust their own Capabilities and Experience.....	11
3.1.1. Child-Parent Trauma	11
3.2. Case Study of a High Loss Victim of Nigerian 419 Fraud	12
3.2.1. When a “Guy” hits the JACKPOT	12
4. The AFF statistics by the 419unit@ultrascan-agi.com	13
4.1. What’s different with our numbers?	13
4.2. What is not different with our numbers?	13
4.3. What IS 419 Advance Fee Fraud and what IS NOT ?	13
5. The Transnational Nature of Nigerian 419 AFF Scams	15
5.1. In Nigeria there are too many to count, but are Nigerian 419 fraudsters everywhere?	15
5.2. Which it is in terms of 419. The 419ers are Everywhere.....	15
5.3. Why is this? Why are the 419ers everywhere? How did this happen?	15
5.4. So sometimes a little paranoia can be a good thing	16
6. Developments, the decade and 2013	17
6.1. What is the situation? Collect, Share and Disrupt.....	17
6.2. 419 Advance Fee Fraud moving to the east!	17
6.3. 419 AFF Scam Spam.....	18
6.4. Web Non-Latin script on the Internet will give a boost to cyber crime.	18
6.5. Money transfer agents conduits to rip people off, Security is a matter of marketing?	18
6.6. Caller ID theft/spoof.....	19
6.7. Mobile Service Providers – Up scaled Target of Corporate ID Theft by 419 fraudsters	19
6.8. Fraud web sites, got the attention of Consumer Protection officials	19

6.9. Money mules	19
6.10. Money laundering	20
7. Murders, suicides, kidnapping and bankruptcies, trending or on the rise	21
8. Counter cyber crime units no significant impact on criminal activity	21
9. The rhizomatic roots of 419 AFF - Cyber Crime networks.	22
10. Growing profits, expanding networks and a game changer.	23
10.1. Drugs	23
10.2. Credit card, internet banking, phishing and check fraud	23
10.3. Game changer leads to an increase of phishing for log-in credentials.....	23
10.4. Proliferation.....	23
11. 419 from criminal inspired activity into ideology driven terror funding mechanism	24
11.1. Synergy between Crime and Ideology in the Diaspora	24
11.2. Boko Haram, too, is financed by cyber crime.....	24
11.3. Romance may not be in your future with a Boko Haram Match.com member	24
12. 419 AFF Country trends	25
13. Nigeria says it wants to clean up its bad image	27
13.1. But Which Bad Image ?	27
13.2. 419 Advance Fee Fraud in Nigeria a Matter of Security	27
13.3. Which Fraudsters Determine Nigeria's International Image ?	27
13.4. It Can Be Easy To Find These Fraudsters !	27
14. Top 25 On Record - AFF resident active scam rings	28
15. Top 25 On Record - Individual members of AFF scam rings	29
16. AFF resident active scam rings – Individual members of AFF scam rings	30
17. Top 25 Estimates - Total AFF active resident scammers	32
18. Top 25 Estimates - AFF Losses Suffered by companies and persons	33
19. Estimates - Total AFF active resident scammers – Losses suffered by victims	34
20. Explanations with the records* and estimates	37
20.1. AFF resident active scam rings	37
20.2. Individual members of AFF scam rings.....	37
20.3. Total active resident AFF scammers.....	37
20.4. Profits before sharing with other scam rings in million US\$	37
20.5. Profits after sharing with other scam rings in million US\$	37
20.6. AFF losses suffered in 2013 by companies and private citizens in million US\$.....	37
20.7. Losses derived from scams – psychological impact	38
20.8. Murders, suicides, kidnapping and bankruptcies, trending or on the rise.....	38

20.9. Loss of careers or jobs caused by 419 AFF	38
20.10. Loss of home caused by AFF	39
20.11. AFF victims Prosecuted for fraud!	39
20.12. Key positions and ownership held by resident members	39
21. 419 AFF complaints from your country 2013	40
22. Do you recognize these 419 Advance Fee Fraud scams	42
Appendices	43
Appendix A: Charts by Country	44
2013 (blue) 2009 (yellow) !	44
Argentina	45
Australia	47
Austria	49
Belgium	51
Bolivia	53
Brazil 55	
Bulgaria	57
Cameroon	59
Canada	61
Chile 63	
China 65	
Colombia	67
Croatia	69
Cyprus	71
Czech Republic	73
Denmark	75
Dubai UAE	77
Egypt 79	
Finland	81
France	83
Gambia	85
Germany	87
Ghana	89
Greece	91
Hong Kong	93
Hungary	95

India	97
Indonesia.....	99
Iran	101
Iraq	103
Ireland.....	105
Israel	107
Italy	109
Japan	111
Kenya	113
Korea, Republic of.....	115
Kuwait	117
Libya	119
Lithuania	121
Luxembourg	123
Malaysia	125
Malta	127
Mauritius.....	129
Mexico.....	131
Morocco	133
Netherlands Antilles.....	135
Netherlands	137
New Zealand	139
Pakistan.....	141
Palestinian Territory.....	143
Philippines.....	145
Poland	147
Portugal.....	149
Romania	151
Russia	153
Saudi Arabia	155
Senegal.....	157
Singapore	159
Slovenia	161
South Africa.....	163
Spain	165

Sweden.....	167
Switzerland	169
Taiwan.....	171
Thailand	173
Turkey	175
United Kingdom	177
United States.....	179
Yugoslavia	181
Global Totals	183
Appendix B: Tables 2009 !	187
AFF resident active scam rings (sorted high low)	188
Individual members of AFF scam rings (sorted high low)	192
Total active resident AFF scammers (sorted high low)	196
AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$ (sorted high low).....	200
Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$ (sorted high low)	204
Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US\$ (sorted high low)	208
Appendix C: Ultrascan Services	212
Appendix D: Case Study Ultrascan Anti Corporate ID Theft Program	220
Appendix E: Corporate Information & Questions	223

1. A fast growing multinational industry.

The Nigerian 419 Advance Fee Fraud came to the attention of the public and regulators during the 1970s over letters generally aimed at small businesses purporting to come from figures in the Nigerian government (often the Central Bank or Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) wanting help disposing of new oil wealth. Those letters were posted in Africa and Europe. In 2002 the US Department of Justice gained a court order to open every item of mail from Nigeria passing through JFK airport in New York, with around 70% involving scam offers. Russell Smith notes that between August and November 1998 Australia Post confiscated 4.5 tonnes of advance fee correspondence (1.8 million items) that had counterfeit postage. The 1980s and 1990s saw the scammers move from print to fax messaging followed by several explosions of email at the end of the millennium and in 2003, with the scammers spamming recipients in advanced economies (primarily those in English-speaking nations). The addressing of that email was indiscriminate, encompassing organisations and personal addresses. Today a mix of all the following approaches is used by the fast growing AFF scam rings based around the globe:

- Mail
- Fax
- Smart Phone, Apps
- E-mail
- Chat rooms, Twitter
- Dating web sites
- Matchmaking web sites
- Internet auction sites
- Social and business networking sites, Facebook, LinkedIn
- Mobile phone SMS
- Internet phone
- Internet gaming (new)
- Personal introduction
- Call centre / boiler-room

Door-to-door - in areas where an internet connection or sometimes phone or fax connections are not yet common circumstances.

There are No reliable statistics on 419 Advance Fraud.

Centralized counter-419 operations are the only way that viable statistics on 419 can be maintained. Decentralized counter-419 operations mean fragmented information and data. Everyone has a piece of the picture, but no one has the full picture.

Cyber crime and other statistics posted on the internet by the authorities of various countries often use categories like auction fraud, non-delivery, credit-debit card fraud, check fraud, confidence fraud, lottery fraud, etc. to classify what are actually 419 Advance Fee Fraud crimes. All of these advance fee fraud crimes listed are in actuality, when they have a West African (primarily Nigerian) connection, 419 Advance Fee Fraud and should be classified as such. Failure to properly classify 419 crimes as 419 crimes distorts any attempt to maintain even moderately useful statistics on the incidence of 419 fraud, minimizing the magnitude and omnipresence of 419 crimes attempted and committed.

Additionally, assuming an advance fee fraud crime with a West African (primarily Nigerian) connection is properly recognized as 419 by the target, and reported as 419 to the authorities, when there is no centralized reporting place for such crimes any attempts at keeping statistics on 419 AFF are even further fragmented. For example, in the US, a 419 victim can choose to file his complaint with not less than three so-called centralized and/or specialized points of reception for such complaints, each of which keeps its own discrete set of statistics. The problem is the same with other countries.

Also, though in reality every single 419 solicitation received by a target is in fact an attempt to defraud that target (a crime), there is no country in the world today which treats such attempts to defraud as prosecutable, actionable crimes. Currently, there is no country which even actively encourages the reporting of these criminal attempts to defraud to the authorities. Reporting, when asked for by the authorities, is normally limited only to cases in which there has been a financial loss. These are of course only a very small percentage of the total criminal attempts to defraud by the 419ers (though the raw number of Loss cases is still huge both in numbers of victims and amounts lost). When only these loss cases are considered in statistics on 419, the true massive magnitude of 419 Advance Fee Fraud criminal activities is obscured - as only the tip of the iceberg of the actual numbers of 419 crimes is being included in the statistics.

1.1. Check fraud

Of all check fraud reported, over 80% is Nigerian advance fee fraud related.

Of all counterfeit checks intercepted by law enforcement, 78% (global 2009) was found on, sent or received by a Nigerian 419 advance fee fraudster.

3 major production centres for counterfeit checks in Nigeria, India and Canada are either under control of AFF organizations or have their largest client base with AFF.

1.2. Lottery scams

95% of all lottery scams are Nigerian 419 AFF based, the rest are usually less sophisticated. Lottery scam mailing - 4% of the recipients react of which 3% (2.5%-2007) pays one or more advance fees.

1.3. Non delivery fraud and auction fraud

We have not analyzed enough raw data to state a percentage but we believe that the majority of those frauds are 419 AFF based. Two of our indicators are that 90% of fake sales and auction websites are 419 AFF based. 97% of the non-delivery/auction fraud that we reviewed was Nigerian 419 AFF based.

Last will, testament, inheritance scam

91% are perpetrated by Nigerian 419 AFF organisations. Many other fraud categories are perpetrated by Nigerian 419 AFF organisations, not just Nigerian letter fraud.

1.4. Centralized reporting

Centralized reporting is the best way to assure an efficient, organized pool of contact data for the public in reporting 419 attempts and losses. Reporting must be kept as simple for the public as possible, to encourage maximum reports. Only by encouraging maximum reporting can the best statistics and information be generated on 419 activities. Having the best information possible is essential for accurately estimating the size of the problem and analysing trends of 419 activities.

2. Victims categorized

2.1. Small loss

In general these have fallen for one of the many quick scams, examples are: lottery fraud, the job- study place visa -offer, inheritance scam or the relief fund scam.

The total losses per victim **vary between 200 and 30000 dollar** over a period of a couple of months to half a year.

2.2. Medium loss

In general these victims have fallen for the request for help to move and/or invest millions. More recent victims were offered substantial low interest loan for which they have to pay all types of advance fees.

The total losses per victim **vary from 15000 to 210000 dollar** over a period of a year to one and a half year.

2.3. High loss

In general these victims enjoyed a high education and have been introduced to "the original 419 Advance Fee Scam" which has evolved in the past 25 years to what it became now. A fraudulent proposal based on a REAL business of multinational proportions (oil, gold, diamonds, medical equipment, vaccines, chemicals, investments, building and/or service contracts), very often the business at hand relates to the business of the victim or business-contacts of the victim and the victim is required to show genuine possibilities and experience to import or export goods and/or services before the first Advance Fees are generated.

The losses are not limited to the Advanced Fees which end up in the pockets of the scam organization. These variations of the 419 scam have in a majority of the cases a fall out to all the other business and private connections of the victim who are unaware brought in to the scam by the innocent victim. Very often the victim and his associates have to invest in: costly preparations - start up real production - pay real subcontractors - to facilitate 'the business' with the scammers and this leads to a snowball effect of damages which have included serious downsizing and bankruptcies of the companies involved. Damages are not limited to private persons or their enterprises, public companies just "feel a higher need" for hiding (translating) the consequences for their share holders.

The total losses per case, **vary from 300 thousand to 12 million dollar** over a period of one and a half to 8 years or longer, but we are aware of cases with higher damages. Cases with damages between half a million and a million dollar are quite common.

2.4. All victims

Sustain emotional damages and when scammed for a longer period they appear to have a "connection" with their scammers which can be compared to the Stockholm-Syndrome. When this occurs it very often proves difficult to convince victims of the fact that they are the victim of a common but none the less elaborate advance fee scam. In many cases victims immediately contact their "trusted" scam contacts to discuss the problem they have with the people who have warned them for the scam, and the scam organization is equipped with all the fake detectives, FBI, Interpol and Secret Service agents or other fake officials necessary to gain control over the victim again

3. Smart people easier to scam

Research on e-mail scams indicates that the high-achieving professionals are frequently defrauded, contrary to the widely held belief that the poorly educated and financially desperate are most vulnerable.

3.1. For the Bigger Scams Victims Need to Trust their own Capabilities and Experience

High-achieving professionals are the most likely to be defrauded, while the poor are harder to trick as they do not trust their own judgment. Doctors are especially vulnerable to scams that encourage them to do good. They often fall for a scam that starts with a request to help the less fortunate. "You need the victims to trust their own capabilities and experience." Our research, also shows a strong correlation between being conned and a family trauma. Among people who lose more than £150,000 to e-mail fraudsters, there is an 85% chance of a recent, parent-related event such as death or acrimonious separation impairing their judgment.

Doctors, architects, engineers and other white-collar professionals are being conned by e-mail fraudsters who lure them into contributing to fake ventures after taking their details from conference websites.

3.1.1. Child-Parent Trauma

Research, showed a strong correlation between white-collar victims and a recent or life-changing family trauma, which appeared to have impaired their judgment.

A review of 362 of the most serious cases, in which victims lost more than £150,000, found that 85 per cent had suffered a parent-related trauma's either death or an acrimonious separation.

The report concludes that those who have suffered a bereavement appear to be more likely to be duped.

One victim, whose father died in a car accident when he was 12, has lost more than \$500,000 (£250,000) over seven years despite having the intelligence to gain a doctorate and help to run his family's business. The victim continued to believe that the fraudsters were genuine.

The poorly educated or financially inexperienced people are not so desirable to scammers because they did not trust their own judgment and soon realised that they had been duped.

Doctors are especially vulnerable to scams that encouraged them to do good. They very often fall for a scam that starts with a request to help the less fortunate in the world through good causes. To perpetrate the bigger scams you need the victims to trust their own capabilities and experience.

A significant number of high-loss cases involved specialists such as psychiatrists, psychologists and neurosurgeons.

The 308 victims who said they had suffered child-parent trauma included two police commissioners of large cities, respected entrepreneurs and 17 directors of companies listed on stock exchanges.

3.2. Case Study of a High Loss Victim of Nigerian 419 Fraud

John, a PhD graduate who has run his family's wine business, first fell victim to a scam in 2001. Seven years and more than \$500,000 later he is still sending money to fraudsters in the hope that one more payment will release the long-promised rewards.

The 55-year-old man, from the west coast of America, witnessed his father die in a car accident at a young age, a traumatic event similar to the majority of highly educated scam victims.

His ordeal began in 2001 with an e-mail offering him a trunk of money filled with dyed banknotes. The so-called "wash wash" scam, which was first developed by Nigerian fraudsters in the 1970s, involves a suitcase filled with worthless black paper, which the scammers claim are dollar bills stained to avoid detection by customs officials.

The victim, who sees a demonstration of bills apparently being washed clean, buys the trunk and then purchases "chemicals" that supposedly remove the dye. John agreed to pay a series of imaginary fees ranging from \$300 to \$10,000. He would hand over more cash no matter how outlandish the reason because he believed that the next payment would be the last.

One fee he paid was ostensibly to get a holy man to lift a curse that had been placed on a consignment held in customs. "My cousin is completely conditioned," John's cousin said. "He really had his soul corrupted and ruined by interaction with these people." The victim has stolen money from his mother's retirement fund and used his cousin's bank account to accept fraudulent payments.

He ignores any advice, even from fraud experts who tell him to stop all communications with the scammers because that he is participating in well-documented scams, because he cannot accept his mistakes. "He believes that one of these days he is going to prove to everybody that he was right all along, and that we are idiots. The idea of making amends (for involving his family in fraud) is overwhelming to him. He would rather he is right, so he could have his self-esteem back."

3.2.1. When a "Guy" hits the JACKPOT

As for the Nigerian fraudsters who solicited John's "help" in 2001 and many other actors that got involved during the intermezzo's, once John became their "Mugu" or "Maga" they hit the JACKPOT!

High Loss victims like John are the rewards, portrayed by their very rich and in their city acclaimed (mentor) "Oga", that every scammer hopes for from the very day they start with sending scam proposals to thousands of foreigners and become a "Yahoo Boy" or "Guy". As long as John and many others continue to respond, the scammers will stay in business as they are always one step ahead, prepared to counter any logical reasoning and another "legitimate" reason to advance fees.

4. The AFF statistics by the 419unit@ultrascan-agi.com

4.1. What's different with our numbers?

- We monitor and investigate what 419 AFF scammers plan and do. We do not wait for victims to file a complaint. Many victims do not report the crime at all, as it is often the biggest mistake of their lives.
- The numbers are based on our investigations from 1996 till now, but mainly recent from March 2003 to December 31 2013.

The information that we collect and analyse:

- Scam proposals via internet, fax and phone through our robots for reception and response in 69 countries. (POR69)
- Complaints of victims that contact the 419 Unit for assistance.
- Communications from perpetrators with victims and plotting of perpetrators with perpetrators. A small number of Police reports and court decisions.
- More than 85,202 scammers, outside Nigeria and excluding “money mules”, have been identified since March 2003, of which 22,669 have been monitored and reported to the authorities in the countries where they were residing.
- **Nigeria: Too Many to Count!**

The 419 Unit of Ultrascan-AGI is not an official reporting centre however in 2013 we did review 9274* complaints (in 2007 - 17475 / in 2009 - 8503) concerning Nigerian 419 advance fee fraud coming from 152* countries (in 2007-161 / in 2009-152):

- Our estimates are based on our records analysed and prepared by 419 AFF experts.
- We investigate and follow volatility and trends of AFF.
- Profile fraud victims – perpetrators, their Modus Operandi and map their locations.

4.2. What is not different with our numbers?

- **Nigeria: Too Many to Count!**
- Our numbers do not show the complete AFF situation in the world, not even in one specific country.
- Our estimates are low, and for some countries probably extremely low. (We will not give estimates if we have no records of our own)
- We have substantial evidence that 82% of the lottery scams and 78% of check fraud are Nigerian AFF related. 72% of counterfeit checks that were found during transport were in possession of a Nigerian. Most counterfeit checks were produced in Nigeria, Canada and India of which a significant number under control of Nigerian AFF.

4.3. What IS 419 Advance Fee Fraud and what IS NOT ?

Outside Nigeria the number "419" only refers to the article of the Nigerian Criminal Code dealing with fraud, nothing more than that!

Nigerians, especially, use the term 419 as a generic term to cover all types of fraud, misfeasance, malfeasance, cheating, embezzlement, misrepresentation, anything that is not on the Up and Up. If an Oga

has promised his girlfriend an Audi, but she only gets a Hyundai, she has been 419ed. If a job seeker overstates his resume, he is trying to 419 his potential employer. If a politician embezzles the appropriation for a new power plant, he has 419ed his constituents. The term “419” has become a part of the popular culture, used as shorthand for all types of “something is not quite right.”

Lots of other folks use the term “419” for various things as well. Some think that 419 is when a criminal reaches into their bank account and steals their money. Some think that 419 is when they are sold worthless stocks or bonds. Some think that when they buy an ostensibly real Armani suit on an auction site, and it turns out to have been made in Hong Kong yesterday, that they have been 419ed.

While it is indeed true that all of the Nigerians and others mentioned above have indeed been somehow cheated or defrauded, None of them have indeed been 419ed.

419 is Advance Fee Fraud with a West African (primarily Nigerian) connection. If a crime is not Advance Fee Fraud, it is not 419. If a crime is indeed Advance Fee Fraud, but there is no West African (primarily Nigerian) connection it is not 419. To be 419, a crime must be both Advance Fee Fraud AND have a West African (primarily Nigerian) connection.

West African (primarily Nigerian) connections that make a given case of Advance Fee Fraud 419 may include, among other things: Use of Nigerian or other West African telephone numbers in Advance Fee Fraud correspondence; Use of Nigerian or other West African IP originations in Advance Fee Fraud correspondence; West African or Nigerian citizens or expatriate participation in Advance Fee Fraud operations, no matter the physical location of the scammer (he may be in London or Madrid and using UK or Spanish phone numbers for example) ; and anything else that indicates a West African (primarily Nigerian) active participation in, or connection to, a given Advance Fee Fraud operation.

Graft is not 419 (it is not Advance Fee Fraud). Phishing is not 419 (it is not Advance Fee Fraud). Stock fraud is not generally 419 (it is not Advance Fee Fraud). Embezzlement is not 419 (it is not Advance Fee Fraud). Counterfeiting goods is not 419 (it is not Advance Fee Fraud). To even have a chance of being 419, a crime has to be Advance Fee Fraud FIRST.

Now, Lottery Fraud is indeed generally Advance Fee Fraud. But if it has no West African (primarily Nigerian) connection, it is not 419. The same thing applies to online auction Advance Fee Fraud, if no West African (primarily Nigerian) connection it is not 419. Same thing applies to Romance Advance Fee Fraud; Employment Advance Fee Fraud; Real Estate Advance Fee Fraud, and all the other infinite forms of Advance Fee Fraud. If there is no West African (primarily Nigerian) connection to a given Advance Fee Fraud scenario or operation, it is NOT 419.

So, the next time someone says something is, or isn't, 419 ask yourself the following two questions:

- Are we discussing a case of Advance Fee Fraud? If so, it Might be 419. if not, it isn't.
- If it is a case of Advance Fee Fraud, is there a West African (primarily Nigerian) connection? If so, it is 419. if not, it isn't.

5. The Transnational Nature of Nigerian 419 AFF Scams

5.1. In Nigeria there are too many to count, but are Nigerian 419 fraudsters everywhere?

Some people believe that wherever they are and whatever they do, they are being watched by their enemies. They believe everyone is plotting against them and that nowhere is safe. They trust no-one. These are symptoms of a serious mental illness known as Paranoia. Unless, of course, it is True.

5.2. Which it is in terms of 419. The 419ers are Everywhere.

There are 419 cells in nearly every country on earth. **There are too many cells in Nigeria to count.** Benin, the UK, South Africa, and Spain are heavily infested. 419er operations are on the uptick in China (both mainland China and Hong Kong), and in Malaysia. There are 419er cells in the USA, Canada, Mexico, Ghana, Brazil, Egypt, Russia, India, Pakistan, and the Czech Republic. These days, about the only place on earth without 419 cells is Antarctica – for now, anyway.



Click for link to 419 Advance Fee Fraud Crime Maps

5.3. Why is this? Why are the 419ers everywhere? How did this happen?

No-one knows for sure, but over the years a variety of contributing factors have been speculatively mentioned by those who study the issue. A few of these are:

- ***The tremendous success over the years of 419ers operating from Nigeria** has made many targets leery of anything to do with Nigeria. **In Nigeria there are Too Many to Count!** So the more successful 419 syndicates felt their success rate would be higher by operating from “branch offices” in other countries as well as from their “home office” in Nigeria.

***Many, many Nigerians have left and continue to leave Nigeria** to work and live elsewhere. So many that in fact the Nigerians themselves call this phenomenon “The Diaspora” – and many 419ers are no different than anyone else, they want out too. Of course they have to make a living when they get to wherever they go – so they continue to do what they know best.

***For many years, the Nigerian telecommunications system** simply did not have the capacity to keep up with the growing needs of the 419 syndicates, so they sent cells out to countries with better telecommunications infrastructure. And these cells spawned other cells, and so on.

***Many 419ers, especially the more successful ones, prefer to keep the bulk of their money outside of the Nigerian banking system**, and indeed out of Nigeria itself, in First World banks, and in First World currencies rather than Nigerian currency, the Naira. Seems they don’t trust their own banks. And they like to have cells where their money is so they can watch it and do transactions locally as necessary.

***419er cells tend to target victims in countries other than the one from which they are based.** 419er cells in Nigeria generally do not target Nigerians. 419er cells operating from the UK tend not to target Brits. 419 cells operating from Spain tend not to target the Spanish. This tends to keep the “local heat” off 419er cells, since the victims are elsewhere so no complaints are being filed with the local authorities by irate local citizens. And this creates a quagmire of jurisdictional, protocol, communications, and other issues for the authorities in the many different countries where there are complaints being filed against a given 419er cell – that they can’t physically get at. So the more cells in more places, the better.


5.4. So sometimes a little paranoia can be a good thing

In short, 419 is one of the longest running, most successful, omnipresent, trans-national, mass marketing campaigns in history. The 419er home offices remain in the relatively safe haven of Nigeria, but like any other international conglomerate they set up local branches in many nations. These branches set up more branches, and so on, in almost a multi-level-marketing business model.

So, are the 419ers among us everywhere in true transnational fashion? Are they actively plotting to defraud everyone they can?

Yes, it’s true.

So sometimes a little paranoia can be a good thing.



6. Developments, the decade and 2013

6.1. What is the situation? Collect, Share and Disrupt

- The majority of Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud is still organized by Nigerians, but no longer initially from Nigeria. Next to, about half a million Nigerian fraudsters in Nigeria's Diaspora, (at least 85,202 that perpetrate their crime from 69 other countries) there are too many to count in Nigeria but at least a couple of hundred thousand fraudsters who have received foreign cash transfers in Lagos (Festac, Ikeja, Ajao and Ajegunle), Ibadan (from where romance scams fund terrorism), Aba, Owerri, Enugu, Port Harcourt, Warri and universities at Ekpoma and universities of Benin.
- In some countries the authorities are attempting to curb the menace with publicity about local 419 scams and examples to warn the public. It is a worthwhile attempt to educate people and prevent 419 cases.
- Other attempts targeting the communication methods/resources of the scammers have been done before and are successful for a couple of days or weeks.
- It's obvious that law enforcements feeble attempts to control this fraud have failed, as evidenced by 3 decades exponential 419 AFF growth.
- The high numbers of perpetrators has the advantage that some of them can easily be found and apprehended red handed on the receiving end of money transfers, however time has passed and the transnational crime organisations have become too large, they are everywhere and comprehensive and can no longer be stopped only (temporarily) disrupted.
- The focus should be centralized data collecting, sharing and disruption; Keywords Collect, Share and Disrupt

6.2. 419 Advance Fee Fraud moving to the east!

While the 419 AFF scam industry in the west has developed in to an unstoppable high-end cash cow, the east is attacked and tested with new and the old fashioned classic 419 proposals.

Markets of Malaysia, India and China but also of countries like Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Vietnam are falling prey to similar classic Advance Fee Frauds as North America and Europe was during previous decades. Where hundreds of thousands of Indians are falling mainly for low-end job and (student) visa scams. Chinese are falling for simple lottery scams perpetrated from Europe and C.O.D. (cash on delivery) scams perpetrated from Africa.

The strategy is also inspired by China's economic investment focus on Africa as well as India's ICT outsourcing projects toward African countries and regions. Africa's enormous natural resources (Oil & Minerals) as well as its growing population need to be recognized as a triggering factor for any (criminal or economic) superpower also 419 AFF.

Classic variations on the scam include "over invoiced" or "double invoiced" oil or other supply and service contracts where the scammers want to get the overage out of West Africa (Classic 419); crude oil and other commodity deals (a form of Goods and Services 419); a "bequest" left you in a will (Will Scam 419); "money cleaning" where your Bad Guy has a lot of currency that needs to be "chemically cleaned" before it can be used and he needs the cost of the chemicals (Black Currency, Wash Wash 419) ; "spoof banks" where there is supposedly money in your name already on deposit; "paying" for a purchase with a check larger than the amount required and asking for change to be advanced

- What we have on record is the tip of the iceberg of a rapidly growing and insidious threat to the global economy, undermining trust and mercilessly exploiting humans for financial gain.

- Direct cooperation between law enforcement from the victim's home country and the scammer's working country is a decided advantage.
- Centralized 419 reporting and counter-419 operations in countries with a high AFF activity are essential!

6.3. 419 AFF Scam Spam

In 11 years the security and Legal departments at ISP's like Yahoo, Google and Microsoft were not able to protect their users and filter out a couple of lottery and inheritance messages and fraudulent web sites on their servers. 419 frauds SPAM is still dispersed at higher volume and the change to targeted e-mail messages has caused concern among law enforcement agencies.

419 AFF proposals through spam, in most cases this is arranged from within the organisation itself, the harvesting of email addresses and the sending of spam. Some organisations have specialized associates that only spam, but the most successful 419 organizations do the harvesting of email/fax/phone/messenger ID's themselves to be able to target specific groups and pay a professional spammer to distribute the scam proposals. 419 AFF is not per definition cyber crime. It is a mainly a confidence fraud using all communication resources available.

6.4. Web Non-Latin script on the Internet will give a boost to cyber crime.

Without Non-Latin IDNs there is every week a minimum of 15 thousand new web sites registered with criminal intent. ISP's have been unable and unwilling to perform the simple task of filtering/stopping criminal abuse of their services. In fact there is enough evidence for the authorities to prosecute ISP's for knowingly facilitating crime and being/providing conduits to rip off people.

The Web Non-Latin script on the Internet will give a boost to cyber crime. The game of internet related crimes is partly starting all over again; just adding Non-Latin characters to previous successful fraud web sites is enough to double for example Corporate ID theft. Let alone the possibility to target victims in their own language, also local criminal organizations will jump on the bandwagon and collect on the successful cyber crime formats and markets that until now were language limited.

6.5. Money transfer agents conduits to rip people off, Security is a matter of marketing?

Fact is that Money transfer agents from Western Union and Moneygram play a major role in laundering criminal profits. A significant number of money transfer agencies are operated by criminal organizations. Conservative estimates show that around 10% of money transfer agents profit knowingly from scams.

Still every day, there are 419 victims that send cash transfers to "staff" of so-called lawyers/attorneys around the world and in most cases the staff of the transfer agent is not protecting their client for a possible AFF in progress, not even if their client is sending money to "pay for collecting on an inheritance or lottery prize" which is a 98% sure signal of Advance Fee Fraud!

Police investigations have shown the abuse of money transfer agencies around the globe, but none of the transfer companies show a self cleaning ability to prevent theft from their clients nor do they thoroughly check their agents for criminal intent or taking part in scams.

The conversations with money transfer companies about this subject are limited to marketing spokespersons denying responsibility, claiming due diligence and compliance with regulations. Security is a matter of marketing?

The Financial Regulators, Fraud authorities and Consumer authorities in most countries have a decade filled with evidence to punish or prosecute the money transfer companies and their agents for knowingly or avoiding knowing, hurting consumers and supporting criminal organisations. Force them to implement a comprehensive anti-fraud and agent-monitoring program.

October 10 2009

MoneyGram to Pay \$18 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Allowed its Money Transfer System To Be Used for Fraud. The Money Transfer Company is also required to implement comprehensive Anti-Fraud Program and to monitor its Agents

MoneyGram International, Inc., the second-largest money transfer service in the United States, will pay \$18 million in consumer redress to settle FTC charges that the company allowed its money transfer system to be used by fraudulent telemarketers to bilk U.S. consumers out of tens of millions of dollars. MoneyGram also will be required to implement a comprehensive anti-fraud and agent-monitoring program.

<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/moneygram.shtm>

6.6. Caller ID theft/spoof

Internet phones or cell phones hacked to show calls as coming from European and US numbers even though they originate from Nigeria.

6.7. Mobile Service Providers – Up scaled Target of Corporate ID Theft by 419 fraudsters

419 AFF Fraudsters are calling Mobile Service subscribers and sending instant messages while posing as representatives of Mobile Service Providers out to offer prizes.

6.8. Fraud web sites, got the attention of Consumer Protection officials

At last, in 2013 and 2014 fake government websites got the attention of some Consumer Protection Departments (Five Arrested Over Fake Government Websites: <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/five-arrested-over-fake-government-websites-082814233.html>)

In 2007 the number of fake company and phishing websites almost doubled from 23000 to 44000 on record. At the end of 2007 there was an average of 1500 fake company websites registered per week, of which every week we registered 120 bogus financial services companies. In 2009 every week a minimum of 20 thousand new web sites, fake professional and personal profiles is registered with criminal intent. Until ISP's have been unable and unwilling to perform the simple task of filtering/stopping criminal abuse of their services. The majority of registrations is with false or stolen ID and the trend continues upward.

6.9. Money mules

A "Money mule" is someone who knowing or unknowingly allows his or her bank account to be used for the transfer of illegal funds for a small commission.

419 AFF comes in many forms. In all cases, money needs to be funnelled back to the scammers in a way that will hide its origins. To this end, the scammers recruit often unsuspecting people.

The offer comes in the form of someone being an agent for a company or a freelance job, collecting payments and sending them on.

The problem is that many people do not see this as a crime. After all, they think, I am just offering a service for which I am getting paid.

By using many of those money mules, the effect is distributed over many individuals making it hard for law enforcement to trace it.

Banks should be able to filter transactions of their customers in order to protect them from becoming a “money mule”.

419 networks have been and still are the major global players in check fraud, at the same time they have the largest number of money mules at their disposal and therefore are top guns for any criminal money laundering job.

6.10. Money laundering

The dollar is still the main scam currency, but there is a significant trend to Asian currencies and the Euro. Money laundering takes place on all levels of these transnational crime organizations.

- On the ground level the routine is noticeably through money mules and cash transfers.
- The second level mainly by investments in real estate markets in the fast growing economies. (Examples are Shanghai, China, Kenya, Dubai and Saudi Arabia)
- The third level still shows the use of airline tickets to launder and transfer ill-gotten profits.
- On the top-level of international crime syndicates, money laundering, transfers and tax evasion takes place through “**the minute system**” when minutes of satellite communications, mobile and broadband phone are the international means to launder money to practically every country in the world.
- Ownership in banks is a way for crime to control normal businesses. We found significance in overcapitalised banks, in countries that join(-ed) the EU or (for example Nigeria) that returned to the international business and banking community when it was taken of the FATF list.

7. Murders, suicides, kidnapping and bankruptcies, trending or on the rise

In some cases victims and/or their companies get so deep in debt to pay all the different advance fees that they are forced to file for bankruptcy. We do not specifically log bankruptcies, kidnappings, murders and suicides that occur during or “after” the 419 scam, only the ones brought to our attention. Between 1996 and 2013 we recorded a total of 31 murders, 35 suicides, 49 kidnap & hostage situations and 1512 bankruptcies (estimate 18227).

While it’s our impression that murders, kidnappings and bankruptcies are more or less trending with the expansion of the problem in recent years and we do not have significantly more suicide reports on record, during our conversations with stakeholders around the world we couldn’t escape the notion that suicides by victims of 419 AFF in particular romance and dating scams are on the rise!

8. Counter cyber crime units no significant impact on criminal activity

Failing to curb cyber crime with specialised law enforcement units has led to the necessity of cyber war departments in several countries.

In the world of cyber-crime the officers and analysts we have dealt with, are more interested in the scientific aspect of the work and the compilation of a generic report in years to come as opposed to having any impact on the criminal activity.

Over the last decade many national authorities have set up special units to counter cyber-crime, including 419. These units tend to be poorly funded and often poorly organized. Today, these units are being merged into sort of Cyber War Departments which are tasked with protecting national IT infrastructures as well as performing counter cyber-crime functions.

In a nutshell there are few practitioners in the world of cyber-crime investigation/efforts and they still do not have significant tactical or strategic input with local or federal law enforcement.

9. The rhizomatic roots of 419 AFF - Cyber Crime networks.

Of course all businesses, including cyber crime, are dynamic and it is necessary to adapt. But adapt to what?

Consider the roots of E- Cyber Crime networks have rhizomatic dynamics: resisting, contaminating, and vitalizing what has been established, integrating unknown actors and open sourced adaptive. No linear growth or (common) organizational structure.

The only guarantee one gets when cutting a head of these “new” criminal networks, is that there are more new heads popping up in (until recent) unpredictable shapes and places.

Media campaign's to warn and educate the public, procedures to protect and change infrastructure, new laws and regulations or arresting a hundred or a thousand obvious perpetrators is positive action, but does not stop the growth and effectiveness of those rhizomatic criminal networks, they adapt faster, their decision cycles are significantly shorter, get better and by the time counter measures are realised they are better.

10. Growing profits, expanding networks and a game changer.

Profits of fraud are sky rocketing for an exponentially growing number of perpetrators of this endemic crime and after investing in to developing recruitment and new fraud markets, profits are flowing in to other crimes including support of terrorism.

10.1. Drugs

West Africa has become the major transporter for cocaine from South America and ingredients for chemical drugs from Asia to Europe. The large Nigerian criminal networks with bases around the world support finance, transport, distribution and money laundering.

10.2. Credit card, internet banking, phishing and check fraud

Card fraud has always been a support industry to facilitate the cross border element of 419 scammers. Scammers travel, communicate and market their services for free by paying with stolen credit card details.

419 AFF networks have been and still are the major global players in check fraud, on any given day they have at least a million money mules at their disposal and therefore these networks are Top Guns for any cross border criminal cashing job.

Internet banking fraud was not a common crime for the 419 networks but since 2009 a cooperation with hackers in Eastern Europe gave access to bank accounts that could also produce bank cheques and cashing checks is the speciality of the 419 organisations. This particular cooperation flourished and expanded in this decade, until 2011 when East European cybercrime became priority for international law enforcement.

10.3. Game changer leads to an increase of phishing for log-in credentials


As part of their core business Nigerian fraudsters perfected the art of asking for identity and bank account details. There is an undeniable synergy with Internet banking fraud, it matched the existing 419 structures seamlessly. What is considered a game changer leads to an increase of phishing e-mail for log-in credentials by sending fake emails to bank customers. When raiding bank accounts they evade bank safety mechanisms by recruiting locals to receive bank transfers and money mules to launder proceeds of the scam

10.4. Proliferation

In 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 profits from 419 AFF organizations financed arms deals, funding mercenaries and the transnational crime networks supported transports.

11. 419 from criminal inspired activity into ideology driven terror funding mechanism

Fraud is shifting from a criminal inspired activity into an ideology driven terror funding mechanism for African based terror organizations and their affiliates in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Between 2003 and 2007 there was evidence of a terrorist connection in the slipstream of 419 fraud networks, supporting attacks. In 2008 and 2009 there was evidence directly linking 419 AFF networks to (attempted) attacks. Evidence is accumulating from 2009 until today, linking 419 AFF to funding and support of both “The Movements” as well as “The Terror groups”. The AFF scams have been escalated to a matter of utmost concern.



11.1. Synergy between Crime and Ideology in the Diaspora

“Unwary of the fact that they were funding terrorism, these US victims paid amounts varying between \$7,300 and \$57,000 to money launderers and recruiters of Boko Haram who reside in the UK.”

http://www.ultrascan-agi.com/public_html/html/Ultrascan_Humint_from_inside_Al-Qaeda_Africa_Affiliates_Part_of_Magnificent_5_Threat_to_other_continents_Alert.html#SynergybetweenCrimeandIdeology

11.2. Boko Haram, too, is financed by cyber crime

“Boko Haram is now one of the key organised groups behind these frauds, and that a good part of the money that is sent by the fraudsters’ victims to Nigeria is actually being used to buy weapons and other supplies for its terror attacks, whether in Nigeria itself or in neighbouring countries”

http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_finance_blog/2014/05/boko-haram-too-is-financed-by-cyber-crime.html

11.3. Romance may not be in your future with a Boko Haram Match.com member

“What had not been widely reported until 2014 are romance swindles with United States citizens (both male and female) on dating sites. Match.com is the most documented connection to Boko Haram, leading Match.com to warn its users of Nigerians’ frequent use of their site for financial gain”

<http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/new-financing-options-boko-haram/cyber-scams>

12. 419 AFF Country trends

Hundreds of American women are being ensnared by Internet scammers based in **Malaysia**, with some losing over a quarter of a million dollars, as **Kuala Lumpur** has become an epicentre for online crime 419 AFF perpetrated by West-Africans.

We noticed an increase in the number of scammers deployed there from **Europe, Canada** and **West Africa**. Reports from all over **Asia, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia** and **Vietnam** but also from the **US**, show an increase of victims whose defrauded moneys are laundered via, in or to **Malaysia**.

The mostly Nigerian conmen, who enter **Malaysia** on student visas, take advantage of the country's good Internet infrastructure to prey on lonely, middle-aged women, wooing them on dating websites before swindling their savings.

We do not specifically log suicides, murders and bankruptcies that occur during or after (because of) a 419 scam, only the ones brought to our attention. Between 1996 and 2013 we recorded a total of 35 suicides, 5 were connected to (caused by) scammers in **Malaysia** of which 2 during 2013. One victim was a young man who lost over 160 thousand euro in what seemed the promising future business with "the love of his life" and the second victim was a middle aged woman that "advanced" more than 100 thousand euro in "hospital bills" and "legal fees" for her "soul mate" that seemed to have a continuous streak of "bad luck" every time he was on his way to KL airport in "pursuit" of finally boarding a flight to meet her.

Nigerian AFF increased again in **Greece**, especially for lottery fraud. The 419 AFF organizations have recruited in **Spain** and **Italy** under African refugees and in **China** and **India** poverty stricken groups are recruited to do 419 AFF front store work like opening bank accounts, registering companies with the chamber of commerce and receiving money transfers. In most countries more locals have been arrested for AFF, this will become mainstream when prosecuting AFF, while the 419 AFF organisations stay aloof. There is no centralized 419 reporting.

In "Little Africa" in Guangzhou, **China** there are scam groups specialized in offering fake jobs with Chinese multinational companies, other scams involve fake (student) visa's and import export non-delivery frauds. Chinese victims tend to fall for lottery or cash-on-delivery scams

We registered an increase of scam activity from the **UK** and a decline in the use of **U.K.** company bank accounts by 419 scammers. But a steep rise in money mules and victims of Auction, Job and Romance fraud. The National Fraud Authority calculated that 1 in 50 British know someone who has been victim of a romance scam. There is evidence linking romance scammers with "The Movement" of "The terror group" Boko Haram in **Nigeria**.

Japan has almost no 419ers that work from there, compared to the high losses of Japanese AFF victims. And it has no longer the exclusive to a very successful extension of the 419 romance scam which has been specifically tuned to victims in **Japan, South Korea** and **China**. The victims are blackmailed after they realise that they have been scammed. The scammers threaten the victims with telling their colleagues, friends and family that they have been scammed, if the victim doesn't keep paying fees. This "shame scam", still seems to work even if a victim is initially scammed for a small amount like \$50.

In 2012 what started as an email scam turned into a real-life kidnap when a **South Korean** man and his daughter were lured to **South Africa** on the promise of tens of millions of dollars in a lottery scheme, they were eventually rescued by **South African** police.

419 AFF scammers not only use **Asian** names to target victims on other continents because they wish to disguise the Nigerian origin of the scam. Also during 2013 these fraudsters had no trouble opening bank accounts (under false pretensions) in **Singapore, South Korea, Japan, India** and **China**. Obviously dodging compliance, KYC and Anti-Money Laundering measures.

In **Canada** there is a high number of Nigerian 419ers. Most of those are perpetrating the whole range of 419 crimes and service other scamrings around the globe. There is a high professionalism among the leaders of the Canadian 419 scamrings, they have built their business and extended it in to the normal business community, owning a Money Transfer agency or Money Change office is very common. There are links to other international organized crime groups and profits are in some cases laundered through foreign banks in which they have a key ownership. In Canada victims of Nigerian AFF can report with "Phone Busters" fraud prevention and reporting centre.

Thousands of **US** citizens have been fleeced of large sums, amounting to millions of dollars, by AFF scammers in **Jamaica**, who tricked them into believing they have won money in lottery games and get them into sending cash before they are allowed to claim their prizes. The **US** Government has been working with the Jamaican police in clamping down on the scam.

In the **US** the consumer authorities invested in media prevention campaigns that don't work as expected. Many internet users fall for new and common AFF, while there is significant increase in loan scams, (holiday) housing and romance scams, lottery scams proliferated.

Not only when Nigeria's national soccer team, it's president or other high ranking Nigerian officials visit **international events**, there is an increase of 419 AFF targeting visitors and sponsors, but also there where you find the US army, in problem areas like **Iraq** and **Afghanistan**, you find Nigerian 419 AFF perpetrators that abuse the communication services to perpetrate romance and abandoned or recovered treasure scams.

However a promising step ahead is being made because the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice is enabling international coordinated actions against the transnational AFF crime organisations.

More country specific information available on valid request.

13. Nigeria says it wants to clean up its bad image

In Nigeria there are too many to count but It is obvious that most of the 170 million Nigerians are not aware that some of their fellow countrymen have earned them the dubious honour of becoming the worlds globalizer for Fraud.

That bad image of Nigeria has become of greater concern to Nigerians and Goodluck Jonathan Nigeria's president bemoans the negative image of his country, which is smeared by 419 Advance Fee Fraud, internet fraud and corruption. Nigerians stop lying to yourselves.

13.1. But Which Bad Image ?

Before Nigerians start to clean their image they should decide which negative image is addressed, the bad image Nigerians have of some corrupt Nigerians or the bad image that most foreigners have of All Nigerians and are reminded of every day !

13.2. 419 Advance Fee Fraud in Nigeria a Matter of Security

The EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is Nigeria's specialized law enforcement agency to fight these crimes and is quite successful for Nigeria. Considering the local circumstances, prosecution for stealing from the nation's coffers is going reasonable well and it secured more than 773 convictions and "recovered billions of naira" (??) since its inception in 2003. Even though one could wish more of the same, the EFCC is at least enabled for steady professional progress.

13.3. Which Fraudsters Determine Nigeria's International Image ?

Sadly enough the good work of the EFCC doesn't reduce the bad international image that proud Nigerians want to get rid of. Because the foreigners that are lured to send money under false pretences to Nigerians every day, couldn't care less about Nigerians stealing from the coffers of the state. As long as those victims don't get any form of recognition and the fraudsters are not prosecuted for Advance Fee Fraud, every Nigerian will potentially be profiled as international fraudster, it's that simple.


Nigerians can change their tarnished international image by punishing Advance Fee Fraudsters and recognizing the millions of victims. By taking on that relatively small but vital group of criminals that smear their name every day, the 170 million honest Nigerians would finally send a strong signal.

13.4. It Can Be Easy To Find These Fraudsters !


Next to about half a million Nigerian fraudsters in Nigeria's Diaspora there are too many to count inside Nigeria but at least a couple of hundred thousand fraudsters who have received foreign cash transfers in Lagos (Festac, Ikeja, Ajao and Ajegunle), Ibadan (from where romance scams fund Boko Haram), Aba, Owerri, Enugu, Port Harcourt, Warri and universities at Ekpoma and universities of Benin.

Unless obtaining a foreign transfer by false pretence is not a crime in Nigeria, it can immediately start cleaning up its international image by connecting money transfers to perpetrators and victims of fraud, on the spot today. In Nigeria lots of offenders are queuing in plain sight for Money Transfer Agency's and the victims have identified them self on the transfer forms. Except for denial of the problem, what can be easier to start a clean-up ?

14. Top 25 On Record - AFF resident active scam rings



15. Top 25 On Record - Individual members of AFF scam rings




16. AFF resident active scam rings – Individual members of AFF scam rings

419 Unit release July 2014	Ultrascan AGI - On Record																	
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates for the countries listed below.	AFF resident active scam rings									Individual members of AFF scam rings								
	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
Argentina	8	7	6	6	5	3	1			92	67	51	45	39	7	3	3	
Australia	14	13	12	13	11	9	8	5	2	124	99	85	87	69	53	39	23	12
Austria	6	7	5	4	3	3	2	2	2	94	102	54	55	42	45	50	51	62
Belgium	15	15	12	15	12	7	7	4	3	222	389	210	269	209	161	159	81	72
Bolivia	12	12	9	9	8	7	1			65	39	35	26	22	12	9		
Brazil**	20	13	13	10	7	5	4	3		238	155	119	91	72	53	33	24	
Bulgaria	7	7	6	6	4	2	2	1	1	63	63	48	50	33	24	33	21	32
Cameroon	20	15	19	16	12	8	3			454	387	428	201	119	71	34		
Canada***	16	15	13	15	17	10	6	5	5	85	67	113	112	143	97	118	62	79
Chile	8	9	5	5	3	3				126	119	35	35	14	3	2		
China**	53	48	45	38	32	21	20	12	2	2332	2411	2009	1728	1498	1176	521	178	73
Colombia	10	7	5	5	3	3	1	1		110	81	53	51	17	5	3	3	
Croatia	2	2	2	1	2	2				3	2	3	1	4	4	2	1	
Cyprus	4	9	7	7	4	2	2	2	1	2	15	16	15	9	8	5	5	2
Czech Republic**	8	6	6	5	5	3	2	2	2	59	43	33	29	16	16	11	13	9
Denmark	10	8	9	9	7	4	3	2	2	62	50	49	51	39	38	41	25	26
Dubai UAE	21	23	20	19	16	10	7	5	2	276	333	298	214	196	121	99	18	2
Egypt	2	1	2	9	7	5	4	4	2	6	3	75	64	39	35	26	19	15
Finland	5	4	5	4	4	3	2	1	1	20	19	18	22	15	11	11	6	5
France**	28	26	27	23	25	19	11	9	7	652	645	651	552	562	547	352	312	127
Gambia	4	7	7	4	2	1				59	96	103	73	47	45	5	4	
Germany	33	30	28	27	24	19	12	9	10	563	504	486	478	455	395	389	311	275
Ghana**	64	53	56	49	51	27	24	16	4	2379	2213	2259	1927	2019	1825	577	283	124
Greece**	20	19	14	15	19	13	10	12	4	294	245	172	166	192	199	152	192	155
Hong Kong **	11	9	7	7	6	4	3	2		151	90	59	51	33	33	17	12	
Hungary**	2	2	3	4	3	3	2	2	2	10	10	11	17	11	14	14	18	16
India**	49	42	37	32	25	15	8	7	3	1610	1268	818	793	502	395	324	107	79
Indonesia	16	13	9	6	4	3	2	1		350	211	151	78	29	20	15	6	
Iran	3	3	1	3	2	2	1			29	17	2	16	9	9	5	2	
Iraq	5	6	5	3	4	3	1	2		116	87	62	28	30	29	10	11	
Ireland	8	9	8	9	12	12	8	7	6	91	109	111	101	175	171	131	128	117
Israel	4	5	3	5	3	3	2	2		37	22	7	18	10	10	5	3	
Italy**	44	40	32	32	39	26	17	15	8	735	514	334	337	471	352	332	209	149
Japan	7	5	5	6	7	6	3	2	1	39	14	16	21	16	15	9	5	2
Kenya **	22	19	20	16	11	6	5	3		507	372	352	189	135	80	73	8	
Korea, Republic of	13	10	6	6	8	7	7	5		152	107	74	79	91	77	52	31	
Kuwait	6	5	3	5	2	2	1	1		46	38	18	25	13	10	8	6	


Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

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Libya	2	2	1	3	1	2				13	10	2	17	2	1	1			
Lithuania	5	5	3	3	5	3	3	2	1	24	26	12	12	19	19	11	5	3	
Luxembourg	2	2	3	3	2	2				10	10	15	19	5	5	2	1	1	
Malaysia**	27	21	18	17	13	10	7	5	2	555	390	305	293	197	133	125	53	51	
Malta	3	4	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	15	19	17	15	12	10	7	4	2	
Mauritius	3	3	3	3	1	1				14	10	12	7	2	2	1	1		
Mexico	9	11	8	5	4	3	2	1		71	98	68	22	12	11	5	2		
Morocco	5	5	5	4	3	3				19	19	19	19	19	15	2	2		
Netherlands	17	16	22	25	32	26	14	17	24	428	523	522	552	729	588	611	777	802	
Netherlands Antilles	3	2	2	2	3	2	1			25	10	15	17	18	11	6			
New Zealand	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	0		17	4	11	11	5	4	3	1		
other countries excl. Nigeria	179	149	137	112	94	62	17	12	36	2278	2038	1812	1669	1611	1008	321	310	272	
Pakistan	8	6	3	4	6	3	1	1		52	28	11	15	21	16	5	4		
Palestinian Territory	1	1	0	0	0	0				5	3	2	1	2	1	1			
Philippines	14	18	14	15	11	6	4	4		50	85	51	52	31	28	12	13		
Poland	8	6	5	6	6	4	3	2	2	43	22	19	24	18	15	12	7	11	
Portugal**	12	17	18	24	20	12	5	3	3	48	77	82	124	63	46	41	26	24	
Romania**	5	5	7	11	7	7	5	5	2	29	39	41	82	37	39	22	26	19	
Russia	10	6	9	7	6	4	2	1		105	68	92	66	51	37	22	12		
Saudi Arabia	4	1	2	2	1	0		1		42	8	15	12	6	6	4	4		
Senegal	3	5	7	12	8	6	1			16	41	53	71	47	36	2			
Singapore	3	3	3	5	5	4	5	3		11	15	13	23	23	26	26	6		
Slovenia	3	4	3	2	2	1				15	21	6	4	6	6				
South Africa	25	26	35	23	33	17	8	7	3	492	507	559	399	485	372	216	173	177	
Spain	49	59	57	53	72	39	24	22	18	1167	1236	1203	1161	1456	1217	913	765	561	
Sweden	5	5	8	8	6	5	3	2	3	41	44	52	51	32	26	16	9	11	
Switzerland	16	11	15	17	17	9	7	5	3	182	102	139	148	151	81	83	12	7	
Taiwan	4	3	6	4	4	4	3	3		45	48	57	25	22	17	16	12		
Thailand**	21	15	17	18	15	7	5	2	3	289	196	254	270	219	129	129	29	31	
Turkey**	11	9	7	8	7	7	5	3	3	126	132	68	69	54	42	31	9	5	
United Kingdom	64	71	67	64	62	44	23	19	20	1557	1606	1590	1327	1511	718	719	713	724	
United States**	61	51	64	54	53	32	21	15	8	2589	2196	2651	2502	2348	411	302	233	271	
Yugoslavia	7	5	4	6	4	3				43	27	22	29	17	18				
Totals	1172	1072	1031	973	916	612	363	280	202	22669	20664	19208	17203	16626	11260	7336	5390	4405	

17. Top 25 Estimates - Total AFF active resident scammers



18. Top 25 Estimates - AFF Losses Suffered by companies and persons





19. Estimates - Total AFF active resident scammers – Losses suffered by victims

419 Unit release July 2014	Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF Low Estimates															
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud LOW estimates for the countries listed below.	Total active resident AFF scammers								AFF losses suffered by companies and persons in million US \$							
	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Argentina	350	260	210	170	130	75	25		55,00	25,00	17,00	10,30	7,00	5,60	2,70	2,5
Australia	860	715	520	560	430	310	275	220	475,00	390,00	245,00	260,00	215,00	210,00	166,00	125
Austria	185	210	115	130	80	95	105	110	12,50	15,60	7,90	8,20	5,30	4,20	3,00	5
Belgium	810	1120	695	890	620	490	390	300	109,00	145,00	92,00	101,00	81,00	65,00	79,0	51
Bolivia	230	120	105	75	50	37	19		16,00	8,90	7,10	4,80	4,80	3,00	0,10	1,1
Brazil**	560	420	290	210	150	85	70	60	179,00	125,00	88,00	71,00	51,00	35,00	22,00	16
Bulgaria	210	230	125	155	75	60	45	35	11,50	11,00	5,50	6,30	2,50	1,50	1,40	0,6
Cameroon	2450	1950	2090	1760	1350	550	130		0,60	1,00	0,45	0,50	0,30	0,10	0,10	0,15
Canada***	1620	1350	2550	2700	3050	3200	3310	3120	149,00	115,00	165,00	210,00	298,00	163,00	158,00	150
Chile	490	410	125	135	60	30			22,00	26,00	9,80	11,50	4,20	2,50	0,21	0,12
China**	6900	7100	5600	4950	4300	4000	3500	2900	1750,00	1610,00	1270,00	1130,00	936,00	655,00	205,00	115
Colombia	830	580	390	410	190	110	10	12	70,60	59,00	29,00	36,00	14,50	6,70	5,60	1,3
Croatia	16	10	14	7	19	15	9		1,70	2,30	0,70	1,40	0,93	0,85	0,70	0,11
Cyprus	7	35	30	39	20	12	9	7	0,40	11,15	12,00	8,20	3,00	1,10	1,10	0,7
Czech Republic**	320	230	175	150	78	40	21	22	49,50	30,00	28,50	16,10	21,00	7,20	6,00	10,5
Denmark	170	130	125	130	80	80	75	39	45,00	39,00	42,00	55,00	21,40	8,60	8,2	7
Dubai UAE	540	790	620	350	262	200	132	70	280,00	330,00	310,00	182,00	111,00	125,00	81,00	45
Egypt	40	15	270	210	120	95	75	52	36,00	25,50	95,00	91,00	72,00	30,00	27,00	32
Finland	82	74	70	85	42	30	21	17	5,55	6,65	5,10	7,00	6,35	3,20	4,10	2
France**	2120	2070	2110	1640	1710	1200	590	515	360,00	335,00	290,00	260,00	320,00	291,00	235,0	192
Gambia	180	295	310	160	70	60	30		2,10	3,10	3,70	0,60	2,40	1,70	1,20	3,2
Germany	2290	2015	2190	2030	1910	1700	1455	1210	560,00	490,00	430,00	410,00	522,00	293,00	280,0	221
Ghana**	5100	4460	4650	3900	4350	3230	2410	1690	29,00	18,90	7,20	8,40	6,20	2,80	3,30	1,7
Greece**	610	490	280	230	220	210	190	210	78,00	51,00	47,00	73,00	108,00	52,00	12,00	53
Hong Kong **	590	380	230	175	82	55	38	17	360,00	190,00	155,00	106,00	76,00	63,00	35,00	32
Hungary**	85	80	95	120	90	80	50	50	4,10	3,50	6,10	2,20	4,30	2,10	1,30	2,7
India**	4670	3200	2060	1910	1140	850	510	190	870,00	660,00	410,00	365,00	239,00	137,00	52,00	32
Indonesia	1520	970	580	235	66	50	38	20	140,00	80,20	73,50	30,20	10,50	12,00	7,00	4,5
Iran	95	60	10	65	30	30	15		26,00	9,00	2,90	10,50	6,30	4,50	2,50	1,7
Iraq	440	305	260	120	150	110	30	28	17,00	3,50	7,00	1,80	1,90	2,10	0,25	2,1
Ireland	130	145	160	150	210	195	170	145	51,00	38,00	61,00	58,50	92,00	66,00	57,0	35
Israel	170	95	27	70	30	25	15	10	57,00	15,00	24,50	16,40	19,30	12,00	2,40	11
Italy**	2220	1410	730	670	1220	1020	830	610	270,00	185,00	112,00	85,00	319,00	179,00	159,0	115
Japan	85	49	75	110	85	60	35	8	680,00	490,00	610,00	560,00	830,00	390,00	270,00	350
Kenya **	1740	1020	880	370	220	200	170	30	44,50	53,00	41,00	28,50	9,00	7,00	5,00	3
Korea, Republic of	260	165	85	90	137	120	104	45	220,00	170,00	95,00	105,00	196,00	131,00	72,00	63
Kuwait	205	190	80	110	50	40	25		29,00	25,50	9,00	13,00	5,10	4,40	4,20	0,6

Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

419 Unit release July 2014	Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF Low Estimates															
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud LOW estimates for the countries listed below.	Total active resident AFF scammers								AFF losses suffered by companies and persons in million US \$							
	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Libya	20	15	18	110	12	10	5		0,54	1,10	7,00	0,61	0,38	0,24	0,30	0,04
Lithuania	35	40	20	15	24	21	15	7	2,60	1,55	0,59	0,62	4,10	2,70	2,90	0,6
Luxembourg	27	25	27	39	27	10	3	3	11,00	9,00	6,50	5,70	3,70	2,10	0,6	6
Malaysia**	2190	1570	1040	930	510	395	260	85	123,00	82,00	65,00	71,00	37,00	22,00	17,00	15
Malta	20	80	55	40	25	20	10	2	2,50	5,50	2,40	5,00	1,60	0,37	0,35	0,1
Mauritius	90	60	75	40	9	5	2		6,50	6,30	5,90	3,00	0,15	0,10		0,1
Mexico	290	375	230	80	35	25	20	15	101,00	89,00	62,00	48,00	43,00	27,00	12,00	17
Morocco	270	230	205	160	50	20			35,00	25,00	33,00	13,50	4,10	3,10	3,00	0,2
Netherlands	950	1040	990	1120	1650	1250	1281	1552	72,00	83,00	75,00	79,00	91,00	89,00	83,0	79
Netherlands Antilles	70	15	30	35	37	30	17		8,50	2,85	3,90	3,50	1,40	1,20	0,80	0,35
New Zealand	120	20	35	30	10	12	7	1	17,00	6,90	8,70	11,00	3,50	8,60	4,10	6,5
Pakistan	130	70	50	75	75	40	15		26,00	22,50	16,00	13,00	7,00	5,80	1,50	0,3
Palestinian Territory	5	3	2	2	3	2	1		5,50	2,80	1,60	1,50	0,85	1,90	0,10	2
Philippines	240	280	215	230	105	50	35	35	15,50	9,20	8,50	9,50	7,10	3,90	1,30	3
Poland	220	130	90	110	55	45	33	20	71,00	53,00	32,50	17,20	13,50	7,90	5,60	4
Portugal**	260	270	310	440	260	150	75	50	36,00	45,00	49,00	34,50	41,00	21,00	19,00	13
Romania**	90	100	110	180	85	65	61	62	9,50	12,90	13,70	17,00	14,70	11,50	6,80	3,5
Russia	710	360	520	350	280	90	35	25	271,00	220,00	196,00	145,00	105,00	91,00	46,00	3,7
Saudi Arabia	120	30	45	35	10	10	10	10	107,00	76,00	54,00	53,00	15,00	17,00	11,00	17
Senegal	80	120	170	260	151	90	31		0,87	0,75	1,50	3,23	0,95	0,15	0,06	0,09
Singapore	45	60	70	110	70	55	60	20	32,50	26,00	21,50	18,00	14,00	11,00	7,00	3,5
Slovenia	25	30	18	10	12	10			3,15	0,10	0,15	0,20	0,10	0,07	0,05	0,03
South Africa	2600	3130	3550	2410	3130	2400	1550	1250	122,00	139,00	101,00	108,00	91,00	86,00	105,00	116
Spain	3900	4120	4050	3850	4280	3940	3140	2840	395,00	355,00	413,00	420,00	485,00	387,00	355,00	350
Sweden	65	80	120	110	75	44	36	29	43,00	48,30	56,00	52,00	53,00	31,00	11,00	26
Switzerland	710	320	475	520	555	410	285	115	279,00	230,00	221,00	235,00	215,00	201,00	130,00	160
Taiwan	210	160	190	90	65	60	50	37	17,00	15,60	9,10	7,20	7,20	5,30	2,90	2,2
Thailand**	1270	590	720	780	630	490	310	110	128,00	75,00	91,00	69,00	61,00	41,00	28,00	19
Turkey**	480	460	205	195	115	100	105	110	205,00	155,00	151,00	110,00	103,00	71,00	55,00	26
United Kingdom	5050	5300	5200	4900	5010	3790	2520	2120	1210,00	1070,00	980,00	1090,00	1230,00	810,00	580,0	530
United States**	12500	10300	12700	12200	11500	9100	6200	3500	2310,00	2220,00	2110,00	2030,00	2110,00	1390,00	830,00	790
Yugoslavia	30	30	30	30	30	20			0,60	3,10	0,70	1,60	1,20	0,50		0,45
other countries excl. Nigeria	13200	10600	9300	7600	7100				0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00		
Totals	85202	73161	69796	62357	58861	41508	31098	23740	12733	10888	9612	9020	9388	6329	4290	3883



20. Explanations with the records* and estimates

- Other countries (excl. Nigeria) with a fast 419 AFF activity growth.
In Nigeria there are too many 419 rings and 419ers to count and quantify losses to victims worldwide.

*(our record) = numbers established through investigations by the 419 unit of Ultrascan-AGI and/or confirmed from open source. Our investigations are focused on countries with a high AFF victim/loss count excluding Nigeria itself and parts of South-America.

20.1. AFF resident active scam rings

Advance Fee Fraud scam rings working from country A to scam victims in country B.
In general a 419 AFF scammer will not scam people in his home country. It's one of the basic rules for the AFF scam to create distance and jurisdictions between him/her and the victim (target).

20.2. Individual members of AFF scam rings

Local AFF scam rings are groups of individual scammers with different tasks and training to perform the scam at hand, specifically adjusted to the victim's state of mind and type of AFF scam.

20.3. Total active resident AFF scammers

Active resident scammers whom we have established the existence of at some point during an investigation, but we have not yet been able to identify the scam ring they work with. We add them to the known members of scam rings to come to an estimate of the total number of scammers in a country

20.4. Profits before sharing with other scam rings in million US\$

These are the profits from scams performed by scam rings in one country. These profits are to be shared with scammers in other countries who provided victims or necessary services to expedite the scam. (2009 Example: AFF scam rings based in The Netherlands built \$368,000,000 US with the assistance from scammers in other countries)

20.5. Profits after sharing with other scam rings in million US\$

Profits from scams performed by scam rings in one country after sharing with scammers in other countries who supplied the victim or provided necessary services to perform the scam. The basic element of this scam is to share the profits as agreed upon. (2009 Example- scam rings based in Belgium made a profit of more than \$31,400,000 US. This does not mean this loot is still in Belgium)

20.6. AFF losses suffered in 2013 by companies and private citizens in million US\$

These are the losses including all the real expenses incurred by the victims in the country itself. The advance fees are paid to scammers in other countries (example: Belgian victims lost over \$51,000,000 US to foreign AFF scammers in 2006)

20.7. Losses derived from scams – psychological impact

Victims very often sustain much more loss than the advance fees paid, such as emergency interest rates, fire sales of assets, lost friendships and even marriages.

(The psychological impact is more devastating to the victim than the financial impact, and the financial impact is catastrophic.)

20.8. Murders, suicides, kidnapping and bankruptcies, trending or on the rise

In some cases victims and/or their companies get so deep in debt to pay all the different advance fees that they are forced to file for bankruptcy. We do not specifically log bankruptcies, kidnappings, murders and suicides that occur during or “after” the 419 scam, only the ones brought to our attention. Between 1996 and 2013 we recorded a total of 31 murders, 35 suicides, 49 kidnap & hostage situations and 1512 bankruptcies (estimate 18227).

While it’s our impression that murders, kidnappings and bankruptcies are more or less trending with the growth of the problem in recent years and we do not have significantly more suicide reports on record, during our conversations with stakeholders around the world we couldn’t escape the notion that suicides by victims of 419 AFF romance and dating scams are on the rise!

20.9. Loss of careers or jobs caused by 419 AFF

Many victims, whether professional or blue collar, lose their career and/or practice.

Many lose their job and are unaware that it is because of AFF. When companies fall victim to AFF, they must downsize or file for bankruptcy. Very often the victim still does believe the scammers or doesn’t want to go on the record as an AFF victim.

One example is a factory with 271 staff that went bankrupt because, after production began, management of the factory was convinced to advance fees to release a first down payment of \$12,000,000 US. The complete contract value was for \$42,000,000 US. The victim was shown in person the following convincing but counterfeit or stolen instruments: diplomatic passport, completion plans for an existing project of national importance, business, banking and government references from several Middle Eastern, Asian and European countries. And last but not least a bank account with a payment in favour of the victim accessible through internet banking on an exact copy of the website of a large Canadian bank. The victim received the account number and codes to access the bank account via internet banking. Only one problem: making transfers from the account failed.

The victim also visited the project and was received with an impressive governmental VIP reception. During his visit the victim met other contractors who were pleased with the project, everything appeared in order. The financial loss, excluding subcontractors was \$9,000,000 US the company went bankrupt and the staff that lost their job think it’s because of bad market conditions and orders that were cancelled. We don’t know what happened to the subcontractors, we assume nothing good. We do know that the scammers involved only made a net profit of \$1,200,000 US. Who cares about the difference between AFF profits and the real total damages?

20.10. Loss of home caused by AFF

In almost all countries we investigated, we were confronted with AFF victims that were evicted from their home by their landlord or the bank for defaulting on their mortgage.

We have found evidence of scammers being proud of the number of victims that lost their homes because of the skill of the scammer responsible. A high number AFF victim foreclosures is seen as an accomplishment by a majority of AFF scammers and also mentioned during some of the AFF training for new recruits.

20.11. AFF victims Prosecuted for fraud!

During the AFF scam, victims are very often threatened with the possibility of a government or international institution investigating their part in “the deal”. Example: tax evasion, money laundering or corrupting officials. This is to make sure that the victim will not involve his own government or other outsiders, whom he would normally trust and consult on “the deal”. Generally, victims have nothing to fear from such threats, they should fear being prosecuted in their own country for bank fraud after they received and cashed counterfeit checks or bogus wire transfers to their bank account.

For example: With cashier's check AFF, local authorities are usually trying to charge the victim with attempting to defraud their bank, or Nigeria, or someone, when in fact it is the AFF victim who is defrauded. Much time and energy is wasted by local authorities on such cases, which are eventually dismissed as they learn more about AFF.

20.12. Key positions and ownership held by resident members

Key positions held by resident members of a scam ring that we have recorded are with: postal services, banks, credit card organizations, insurance, transport, oil companies, embassies, hotels, airports, police, immigrations, academic hospitals, intelligence related companies and state departments.

Key ownership connected to AFF scam rings we have recorded in: banks, Western Union and Moneygram agencies, Internet cafés, customs clearing agents, car dealerships, and hotels

21. 419 AFF complaints from your country 2013

The 419 Unit of Ultrascan is not an official reporting centre however in 2013 we did review 9274 complaints concerning Nigerian 419 advance fee fraud coming from 152 countries			
Afghanistan	3	Kyrgyzstan	2
Albania	13	Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Algeria	9	Latvia	9
Andorra	1	Lebanon	21
Argentina	31	Libya	1
Armenia	4	Lithuania	9
Australia	128	Luxembourg	8
Austria	41	Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of	17
Azerbaijan	12	Malawi	1
Bahamas	2	Malaysia	121
Bahrain	16	Maldives	5
Bangladesh	91	Mali	1
Barbados	5	Malta	2
Belarus	6	Mauritius	4
Belgium	206	Mexico	57
Belize	4	Moldova, Republic of	7
Benin	7	Mongolia	4
Bhutan	2	Montenegro	4
Bolivia	3	Morocco	13
Bosnia and Herzegovina	11	Mozambique	2
Brazil	106	Myanmar	6
Brunei	4	Namibia	2
Bulgaria	47	Nepal	22
Burkina Faso	6	Netherlands	301
Cambodia	6	New Zealand	20
Cameroon	14	Nigeria	433
Canada	242	Norway	63
Chile	12	Oman	6
China	41	Pakistan	145
Colombia	24	Palestinian Territory	1
Costa Rica	3	Panama	7
Cote D'Ivoire	10	Papua New Guinea	3
Croatia	15	Peru	5
Cuba	1	Philippines	135
Curacao	8	Poland	38
Cyprus	12	Portugal	33
Czech Republic	51	Puerto Rico	9
Denmark	34	Qatar	26
Djibouti	2	Romania	184
Dominica	1	Russian Federation	111
Dominican Republic	2	Rwanda	4
Ecuador	5	Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Egypt	25	Saint Lucia	1

El Salvador	3	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2
Estonia	8	Saudi Arabia	35
Ethiopia	19	Senegal	3
Fiji	1	Serbia	27
Finland	68	Singapore	48
France	128	Slovakia	5
Gabon	1	Slovenia	40
Georgia	19	South Africa	70
Germany	211	Spain	110
Ghana	113	Sri Lanka	36
Gibraltar	1	Sudan	1
Greece	64	Suriname	1
Guam	3	Sweden	91
Guatemala	1	Switzerland	63
Haiti	1	Taiwan	20
Honduras	3	Tanzania	5
Hong Kong	29	Thailand	39
Hungary	21	Togo	2
Iceland	5	Trinidad and Tobago	5
India	656	Tunisia	10
Indonesia	162	Turkey	71
Iran, Islamic Republic of	35	Uganda	7
Iraq	4	Ukraine	36
Ireland	37	United Arab Emirates	200
Israel	126	United Kingdom	847
Italy	135	Uruguay	1
Jamaica	26	Uzbekistan	2
Japan	218	Venezuela	10
Jordan	1	Vietnam	18
Kazakhstan	5	Virgin Islands, U.S.	1
Kenya	35	Yemen	8
Korea, Republic of	18	Zambia	3
Kuwait	12	United States	2177
		Total	9274

22. Do you recognize these 419 Advance Fee Fraud scams

- Lottery scam
- Counterfeit Postal draft scam
- Over invoiced contract scam
- eBay check (over) payment and refund scam
- Unclaimed inheritance scam
- Unclaimed bank account scam
- Counterfeit Check scam
- Dating-romance scam
- Black (defaced) currency scam
- Gold dust scam
- Diamond scam
- Fake bank scam
- Housing scam
- Anti-terrorist certificate scam
- Disaster relief fund scam
- Financial representative in your country scam
- Work permit scam
- Payment for art scam
- Deceased next of kin scam
- Construction sub contractor scam
- Lower priced crude oil scam
- SWIFT transfer scam
- Antique export payments scam
- University study place scam
- Money from former ruler scam
- Relative of holocaust victim scam
- Identity theft
- Jobs for professionals scam
- Dead millionaire funds for charities or disaster relief scam
- Very low interest loans for relatively small advance fees scam
- Hotel bookings and refund
- United Nations loan approval scam
- Death threat scam


Appendices

Appendix A: Charts by Country


2013 (blue) 2009 (yellow) !

Argentina


419Unit release July 2014: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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Argentina




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


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
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
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
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
Australia



Australia




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


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
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
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
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
Austria



Austria




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


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
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
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
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
Belgium



Belgium




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


Bolivia


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
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
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
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Bolivia




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


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
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
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
Brazil




Brazil



Brazil




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


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
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
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
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
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Bulgaria




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


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
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
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
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
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Cameroon




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


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
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
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
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
Canada



Canada




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


Chile


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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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


Croatia


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
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
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
Croatia



Croatia




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


Cyprus


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
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
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
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Cyprus




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


Czech Republic


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
Czech.Republic




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
Czech.Republic



Czech.Republic




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


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
419Unit release July 2014: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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Denmark




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


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
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
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
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
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Dubai.UAE




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


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
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
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
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
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Egypt




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


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
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
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
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
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Finland




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


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
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
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
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
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France




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


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
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
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
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
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Gambia




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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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Ghana




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


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
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
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
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
Greece



Greece




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


Hong Kong


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
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
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
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Hong_Kong




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


Hungary


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
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
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
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Hungary




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


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
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
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
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
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India




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


Indonesia


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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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Iran




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


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
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
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
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
Iraq



Iraq




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


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
419Unit release July 2014: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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Ireland




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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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Italy




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


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
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
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
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
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Japan




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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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Kuwait




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


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
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
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
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
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Libya




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


Lithuania


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
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
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
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Lithuania




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


Luxembourg


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
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
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
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Luxembourg




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


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
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
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
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
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Malaysia




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


Malta


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
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
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
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Malta




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


Mauritius


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
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
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
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Mauritius




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


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
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
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
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
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Mexico




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


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
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
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
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
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Morocco




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


Netherlands Antilles


419Unit release July 2014: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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Netherlands_Antilles




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


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
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
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
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
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Netherlands




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


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
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
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
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
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New Zealand




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


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
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
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
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
Pakistan



Pakistan




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


Palestinian Territory


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
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
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
Palestinian Territory



Palestinian Territory




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


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
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
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
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
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Philippines




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


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
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
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
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
Poland



Poland




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


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
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
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
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
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Portugal




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


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
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
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
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
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Romania




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


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
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
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
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
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Russia




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


Saudi Arabia


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
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
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
Saudi Arabia



Saudi Arabia




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


Senegal


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
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
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
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Senegal




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


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
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
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
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
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Singapore




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


Slovenia


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
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
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
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Slovenia




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


South Africa


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
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
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
South_Africa



South_Africa




South Africa




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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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Sweden




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


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
419Unit release January 2010: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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Switzerland




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


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
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
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
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
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Taiwan




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


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
419Unit release July 2014: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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Thailand




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


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
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
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
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
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Turkey




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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
419Unit release January 2010: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.




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
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
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



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



Global Totals



419Unit release July 2014: Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud on record* and low estimates.





Totals



Totals



Totals



Appendix B: Tables **2009 !**

AFF resident active scam rings (sorted high low)

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF Low Estimates			
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud <u>Sorted High Low</u> for the countries listed below.	AFF resident active scam rings	Individual members of AFF scam rings	Total active resident AFF scammers	AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$	Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$	Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US\$
	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
other countries**** excl. Nigeria	94	1611		0		0
Spain	72	1456	4280	485	1020	397,8
United Kingdom	62	1511	5010	1230	1296	375,84
United States**	53	2348	11500	2110	1138	204,84
Ghana**	51	2019	4350	6,2	417	283,56
Italy**	39	471	1220	319	415	120,35
South Africa	33	485	3130	91	581	168,49
China**	32	1498	4300	936	1050	409,5
Netherlands	32	729	1650	91	710	156,2
France**	25	562	1710	320	317	110,95
India**	25	502	1140	239	251	55,22
Germany	24	455	1910	522	506	278,3
Portugal**	20	63	260	41	76	26,6
Greece**	19	192	220	108	283	121,69
Canada***	17	143	3050	298	470	206,8
Switzerland	17	151	555	215	740	569,8
Dubai UAE	16	196	262	111	305	234,85
Thailand**	15	219	630	61	392	254,8

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF <u>Low Estimates</u>			
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud <u>Sorted High Low</u> for the countries listed below.	AFF resident active scam rings	Individual members of AFF scam rings	Total active resident AFF scammers	AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$	Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$	Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US\$
	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Malaysia**	13	197	510	37	91	22,75
Belgium	12	209	620	81	129	60,63
Cameroon	12	119	1350	0,3	45,5	15,015
Ireland	12	175	210	92	136	88,4
Australia	11	69	430	215	280	120,4
Kenya **	11	135	220	9	65	27,3
Philippines	11	31	105	7,1	123	94,71
Bolivia	8	22	50	4,8	16,1	6,279
Korea, Republic of	8	91	137	196	217	62,93
Senegal	8	47	151	0,95	20,1	5,427
Brazil**	7	72	150	51	69,5	54,21
Denmark	7	39	80	21,4	17	6,63
Egypt	7	39	120	72	31,5	21,42
Japan	7	16	85	830	228	196,08
Romania**	7	37	85	14,7	26	13,78
Turkey**	7	54	115	103	118	64,9
Hong Kong **	6	33	82	76	125	85
Pakistan	6	21	75	7	88	35,2
Poland	6	18	55	13,5	14,1	7,332

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF <u>Low Estimates</u>			
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	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Russia	6	51	280	105	430	129
Sweden	6	32	75	53	24	6,48
Argentina	5	39	130	7	10,7	3,531
Lithuania	5	19	24	4,1	93	38,13
Singapore	5	23	70	14	81	34,83
Czech Republic**	5	16	78	21	10,1	7,171
Bulgaria	4	33	75	2,5	3,6	2,448
Cyprus	4	9	20	3	34,7	27,413
Finland	4	15	42	6,35	5,2	4,472
Indonesia	4	29	66	10,5	26,7	7,743
Iraq	4	30	150	1,9	42	6,3
Mexico	4	12	35	43	43	12,9
Taiwan	4	22	65	7,2	51	11,22
Yugoslavia	4	17	30	1,2	2,1	1,155
Austria	3	42	80	5,3	24	19,68
Chile	3	14	60	4,2	23,6	9,44
Colombia	3	17	190	14,5	6,1	2,135
Hungary**	3	11	90	4,3	6,9	3,795

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF <u>Low Estimates</u>			
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud <u>Sorted High Low</u> for the countries listed below.	AFF resident active scam rings	Individual members of AFF scam rings	Total active resident AFF scammers	AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$	Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$	Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US\$
	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Israel	3	10	30	19,3	4,4	2,42
Malta	3	12	25	1,6	12	4,2
Morocco	3	19	50	4,1	3,1	1,147
Netherlands Antilles	3	18	37	1,4	26,7	10,413
Croatia	2	4	19	0,93	0,8	0,248
Gambia	2	47	70	2,4	1,1	0,264
Iran	2	9	30	6,3	9,3	2,883
Kuwait	2	13	50	5,1	4,5	0,9
Luxembourg	2	5	27	3,7	33	26,4
Slovenia	2	6	12	0,1	0,9	0,216
Libya	1	2	12	0,38	1,2	0,324
Mauritius	1	2	9	0,15	2,9	0,551
New Zealand	1	5	10	3,5	7,3	2,117
Saudi Arabia	1	6	10	15	3	0,96
Palestinian Territory	0	2	3	0,85	0,5	0,275
Totals	916	16626	51761	9387,81	12835,2	5345,144

Individual members of AFF scam rings (sorted high low)

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF <u>Low Estimates</u>			
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud <u>Sorted High Low</u> for the countries listed below.	AFF resident active scam rings	Individual members of AFF scam rings	Total active resident AFF scammers	AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$	Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$	Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US\$
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Ghana**	51	2019	4350	6,2	417	283,56
other countries**** excl. Nigeria	94	1611		0		0
United Kingdom	62	1511	5010	1230	1296	375,84
China**	32	1498	4300	936	1050	409,5
Spain	72	1456	4280	485	1020	397,8
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Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF <u>Low Estimates</u>			
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Kenya **	11	135	220	9	65	27,3
Cameroon	12	119	1350	0,3	45,5	15,015
Korea, Republic of	8	91	137	196	217	62,93
Brazil**	7	72	150	51	69,5	54,21
Australia	11	69	430	215	280	120,4
Portugal**	20	63	260	41	76	26,6
Turkey**	7	54	115	103	118	64,9
Russia	6	51	280	105	430	129
Senegal	8	47	151	0,95	20,1	5,427
Gambia	2	47	70	2,4	1,1	0,264
Austria	3	42	80	5,3	24	19,68
Denmark	7	39	80	21,4	17	6,63
Egypt	7	39	120	72	31,5	21,42
Argentina	5	39	130	7	10,7	3,531
Romania**	7	37	85	14,7	26	13,78
Hong Kong **	6	33	82	76	125	85

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	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Bulgaria	4	33	75	2,5	3,6	2,448
Sweden	6	32	75	53	24	6,48
Philippines	11	31	105	7,1	123	94,71
Iraq	4	30	150	1,9	42	6,3
Indonesia	4	29	66	10,5	26,7	7,743
Singapore	5	23	70	14	81	34,83
Bolivia	8	22	50	4,8	16,1	6,279
Taiwan	4	22	65	7,2	51	11,22
Pakistan	6	21	75	7	88	35,2
Lithuania	5	19	24	4,1	93	38,13
Morocco	3	19	50	4,1	3,1	1,147
Poland	6	18	55	13,5	14,1	7,332
Netherlands Antilles	3	18	37	1,4	26,7	10,413
Yugoslavia	4	17	30	1,2	2,1	1,155
Colombia	3	17	190	14,5	6,1	2,135
Japan	7	16	85	830	228	196,08
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Finland	4	15	42	6,35	5,2	4,472



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	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Chile	3	14	60	4,2	23,6	9,44
Kuwait	2	13	50	5,1	4,5	0,9
Mexico	4	12	35	43	43	12,9
Malta	3	12	25	1,6	12	4,2
Hungary**	3	11	90	4,3	6,9	3,795
Israel	3	10	30	19,3	4,4	2,42
Cyprus	4	9	20	3	34,7	27,413
Iran	2	9	30	6,3	9,3	2,883
Slovenia	2	6	12	0,1	0,9	0,216
Saudi Arabia	1	6	10	15	3	0,96
Luxembourg	2	5	27	3,7	33	26,4
New Zealand	1	5	10	3,5	7,3	2,117
Croatia	2	4	19	0,93	0,8	0,248
Libya	1	2	12	0,38	1,2	0,324
Mauritius	1	2	9	0,15	2,9	0,551
Palestinian Territory	0	2	3	0,85	0,5	0,275
Totals	916	16626	51761	9387,81	12835,2	5345,144

Ultrascan AGI
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
info@ultrascan-agi.com
Tel: +31 20 80 80 336

Total active resident AFF scammers (sorted high low)

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	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
United States**	53	2348	11500	2110	1138	204,84
United Kingdom	62	1511	5010	1230	1296	375,84
Ghana**	51	2019	4350	6,2	417	283,56
China**	32	1498	4300	936	1050	409,5
Spain	72	1456	4280	485	1020	397,8
South Africa	33	485	3130	91	581	168,49
Canada***	17	143	3050	298	470	206,8
Germany	24	455	1910	522	506	278,3
France**	25	562	1710	320	317	110,95
Netherlands	32	729	1650	91	710	156,2
Cameroon	12	119	1350	0,3	45,5	15,015
Italy**	39	471	1220	319	415	120,35
India**	25	502	1140	239	251	55,22
Thailand**	15	219	630	61	392	254,8
Belgium	12	209	620	81	129	60,63
Switzerland	17	151	555	215	740	569,8
Malaysia**	13	197	510	37	91	22,75
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Ultrascan AGI
Amsterdam
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Russia	6	51	280	105	430	129
Dubai UAE	16	196	262	111	305	234,85
Portugal**	20	63	260	41	76	26,6
Greece**	19	192	220	108	283	121,69
Kenya **	11	135	220	9	65	27,3
Ireland	12	175	210	92	136	88,4
Colombia	3	17	190	14,5	6,1	2,135
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Sweden	6	32	75	53	24	6,48
Pakistan	6	21	75	7	88	35,2
Gambia	2	47	70	2,4	1,1	0,264
Singapore	5	23	70	14	81	34,83
Indonesia	4	29	66	10,5	26,7	7,743
Taiwan	4	22	65	7,2	51	11,22
Chile	3	14	60	4,2	23,6	9,44
Poland	6	18	55	13,5	14,1	7,332
Bolivia	8	22	50	4,8	16,1	6,279
Morocco	3	19	50	4,1	3,1	1,147
Kuwait	2	13	50	5,1	4,5	0,9
Finland	4	15	42	6,35	5,2	4,472
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Yugoslavia	4	17	30	1,2	2,1	1,155
Israel	3	10	30	19,3	4,4	2,42
Iran	2	9	30	6,3	9,3	2,883
Luxembourg	2	5	27	3,7	33	26,4
Malta	3	12	25	1,6	12	4,2
Lithuania	5	19	24	4,1	93	38,13
Cyprus	4	9	20	3	34,7	27,413
Croatia	2	4	19	0,93	0,8	0,248
Slovenia	2	6	12	0,1	0,9	0,216
Libya	1	2	12	0,38	1,2	0,324
Saudi Arabia	1	6	10	15	3	0,96
New Zealand	1	5	10	3,5	7,3	2,117
Mauritius	1	2	9	0,15	2,9	0,551
Palestinian Territory	0	2	3	0,85	0,5	0,275
other countries**** excl. Nigeria	94	1611		0		0
Totals	916	16626	51761	9387,81	12835,2	5345,144

AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$ (sorted high low)

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Ultrascan AGI
Amsterdam
The Netherlands

info@ultrascan-agi.com

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Egypt	7	39	120	72	31,5	21,42
Thailand**	15	219	630	61	392	254,8
Sweden	6	32	75	53	24	6,48
Brazil**	7	72	150	51	69,5	54,21
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Malaysia**	13	197	510	37	91	22,75
Denmark	7	39	80	21,4	17	6,63
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Israel	3	10	30	19,3	4,4	2,42
Saudi Arabia	1	6	10	15	3	0,96
Romania**	7	37	85	14,7	26	13,78
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Argentina	5	39	130	7	10,7	3,531
Pakistan	6	21	75	7	88	35,2
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Ghana**	51	2019	4350	6,2	417	283,56
Austria	3	42	80	5,3	24	19,68
Kuwait	2	13	50	5,1	4,5	0,9
Bolivia	8	22	50	4,8	16,1	6,279
Hungary**	3	11	90	4,3	6,9	3,795
Chile	3	14	60	4,2	23,6	9,44
Morocco	3	19	50	4,1	3,1	1,147
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Slovenia	2	6	12	0,1	0,9	0,216
other countries**** excl. Nigeria	94	1611		0		0
Totals	916	16626	51761	9387,81	12835,2	5345,144

Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$ (sorted high low)

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Ultrascan AGI
Amsterdam
The Netherlands

info@ultrascan-agi.com

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Lithuania	5	19	24	4,1	93	38,13
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Morocco	3	19	50	4,1	3,1	1,147
Saudi Arabia	1	6	10	15	3	0,96
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Yugoslavia	4	17	30	1,2	2,1	1,155
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Thailand**	15	219	630	61	392	254,8
Dubai UAE	16	196	262	111	305	234,85
Canada***	17	143	3050	298	470	206,8
United States**	53	2348	11500	2110	1138	204,84
Japan	7	16	85	830	228	196,08
South Africa	33	485	3130	91	581	168,49
Netherlands	32	729	1650	91	710	156,2
Russia	6	51	280	105	430	129
Greece**	19	192	220	108	283	121,69
Australia	11	69	430	215	280	120,4
Italy**	39	471	1220	319	415	120,35
France**	25	562	1710	320	317	110,95

Ultrascan AGI
Amsterdam
The Netherlands

info@ultrascan-agi.com

Tel: +31 20 80 80 336

419Unit release January 2010	Ultrascan AGI - <u>On Record</u>		Ultrascan AGI - 419 AFF <u>Low Estimates</u>			
Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud <u>Sorted High Low</u> for the countries listed below.	AFF resident active scam rings	Individual members of AFF scam rings	Total active resident AFF scammers	AFF losses suffered in 2009 by companies and persons in million US\$	Profits before sharing with other scamrings in million US\$	Profits after sharing with other scamrings in million US\$
	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Philippines	11	31	105	7,1	123	94,71
Ireland	12	175	210	92	136	88,4
Hong Kong **	6	33	82	76	125	85
Turkey**	7	54	115	103	118	64,9
Korea, Republic of	8	91	137	196	217	62,93
Belgium	12	209	620	81	129	60,63
India**	25	502	1140	239	251	55,22
Brazil**	7	72	150	51	69,5	54,21
Lithuania	5	19	24	4,1	93	38,13
Pakistan	6	21	75	7	88	35,2
Singapore	5	23	70	14	81	34,83
Cyprus	4	9	20	3	34,7	27,413
Kenya **	11	135	220	9	65	27,3
Portugal**	20	63	260	41	76	26,6
Luxembourg	2	5	27	3,7	33	26,4
Malaysia**	13	197	510	37	91	22,75
Egypt	7	39	120	72	31,5	21,42
Austria	3	42	80	5,3	24	19,68

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	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Cameroon	12	119	1350	0,3	45,5	15,015
Romania**	7	37	85	14,7	26	13,78
Mexico	4	12	35	43	43	12,9
Taiwan	4	22	65	7,2	51	11,22
Netherlands Antilles	3	18	37	1,4	26,7	10,413
Chile	3	14	60	4,2	23,6	9,44
Indonesia	4	29	66	10,5	26,7	7,743
Poland	6	18	55	13,5	14,1	7,332
Czech Republic**	5	16	78	21	10,1	7,171
Denmark	7	39	80	21,4	17	6,63
Sweden	6	32	75	53	24	6,48
Iraq	4	30	150	1,9	42	6,3
Bolivia	8	22	50	4,8	16,1	6,279
Senegal	8	47	151	0,95	20,1	5,427
Finland	4	15	42	6,35	5,2	4,472
Malta	3	12	25	1,6	12	4,2
Hungary**	3	11	90	4,3	6,9	3,795
Argentina	5	39	130	7	10,7	3,531

Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

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	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009
Iran	2	9	30	6,3	9,3	2,883
Bulgaria	4	33	75	2,5	3,6	2,448
Israel	3	10	30	19,3	4,4	2,42
Colombia	3	17	190	14,5	6,1	2,135
New Zealand	1	5	10	3,5	7,3	2,117
Yugoslavia	4	17	30	1,2	2,1	1,155
Morocco	3	19	50	4,1	3,1	1,147
Saudi Arabia	1	6	10	15	3	0,96
Kuwait	2	13	50	5,1	4,5	0,9
Mauritius	1	2	9	0,15	2,9	0,551
Libya	1	2	12	0,38	1,2	0,324
Palestinian Territory	0	2	3	0,85	0,5	0,275
Gambia	2	47	70	2,4	1,1	0,264
Croatia	2	4	19	0,93	0,8	0,248
Slovenia	2	6	12	0,1	0,9	0,216
other countries**** excl. Nigeria	94	1611		0		0
Totals	916	16626	51761	9387,81	12835,2	5345,144

Appendix C: Ultrascan Services

‘Knowledge itself is power’ -

SIR FRANCIS BACON (*Meditationes Sacrae* – 1597)

Ultrascan Services

‘The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn’ –

ALVIN TOFFLER


Introduction

Ultrascan is an international research organization with over 3200 experts in 69 countries. Ultrascan has been established in 1996.

What sets Ultrascan apart is its “feet in the street”. Ultrascan not only employs academics, but also doctors, physicians and ex Law enforcement personnel, a powerful mix of science and streetwise skills. 90% of our experts are local: they speak the language and have a vast network in their home country.

Ultrascan Services consist of:

1. Ultrascan Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) Services;
2. Ultrascan Interim & Recruitment Services;
3. Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations (AGI);
4. Ultrascan Product Development;
5. Ultrascan Software Services.



Ultrascan Knowledge Process Outsourcing Services

‘Knowledge itself is power’ is the world famous aphorism by Sir Francis Bacon. Nowadays, in our information society, this aphorism is often translated in ‘*Information* is power’.

In Ultrascan’s vision information is build upon knowledge, and power is build upon information.

In our view knowledge is more about the objective facts, which translates in information, which also includes the more subjective facts (e.g., your own feelings).

Gathering knowledge should be the basis of every company process and decision. But gathering knowledge can be a daunting task in our international world. Not every company has the resources to do so. There may also be other valid reasons for companies to not undertake the knowledge gathering by themselves: company A would not like company B to know it is researching company B regarding a possible takeover. Or a bank does not have the resources and skills to research and disrupt the corporate identity fraud it fell victim too.

In such situations and of course many others, it is worth considering Ultrascan KPO Services or the services of Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations.

There are several advantages to using KPO firms. By outsourcing non-core business activities, organizations will definitely save a great deal of money and time. There is no time and there are no resources lost to acquire necessary skills. Businesses can also gain more operational efficiencies because they can focus on the key growth areas of their industries instead of spending time and manpower on basic research and development.

KPO could be considered a high-end activity of the business process outsourcing (BPO) industry. There are several differences between the two, however. Where KPO is about intellectual and analytical processes completed by educated and trained employees, BPO is about standardized routine processes done by workers with minimal skills.

Ultrascan Interim Services

While executing its KPO and AGI services, Ultrascan has met and has been working with many skilled people.

We have an extensive international network of highly educated and trained professionals. Many of them have dealt with sensitive information during their careers.

Ultrascan Interim Services can help you finding the right trustworthy person.

Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

Ultrascan AGI focuses on researching and disrupting global Open Source Criminal Networks (OSCN).


An OSCN can be defined as:

- Open Source - all resources to perpetrate a crime are for free (or exceptionally low priced) available, profits are shared afterwards;
- Cross border - perpetrator and victim are in different jurisdictions;
- Criminal Networks - perpetrators operate anonymously in their network.

Ultrascan has been offering its services for over 17 years.

Ultrascan KPO Services

***Knowledge process outsourcing (KPO)** is a form of outsourcing, in which knowledge-related and information-related work is carried out by workers in a different company or by a subsidiary of the same organization, which may be in the same country or in an offshore location to save cost. Unlike the outsourcing of manufacturing, this typically involves high-value work carried out by highly skilled staff. KPO firms, in addition to providing expertise in the processes themselves, often make many low level business decisions—typically those that are easily undone if they conflict with higher-level business plans. (Source: Wikipedia)*




Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations

Acting for lawyers, businesses, financial institutions, government departments and private individuals, Ultrascan provides advanced investigative solutions in such areas as card fraud, money laundering, asset tracing, and counterfeiting.

provided by . .

Based in Amsterdam and Paris, Ultrascan has highly productive units concentrating specifically on investigations, detection and disruption. We offer a most personal service from loyal and committed staff. We are equally adept in virtually all jurisdictions, including those in which a corporate veil is promoted on a governmental level.

You will find our friendly staff helpful and direct. We will quickly tell you whether we can assist and which of our services may help in your particular case.
All enquiries are dealt with in strictest confidence.



Appendix D: Case Study Ultrascan Anti Corporate ID Theft Program

Cyber-Crime Targeting a Multi National Company (real name changed in to MNC)

Over the last three years we detected an exponential increase in the volume of online traffic by cybercriminals using the name of the MNC in Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) schemes. The inherent openness and anonymity of the internet are creating unprecedented challenges for the Company. Crimes of fraud, brand abuse and unauthorized use of MNC intellectual property have moved online and are increasingly dangerous to the reputation of all international institutions. The Company trademarks, logo, information and both the collective and individual identities of the Company are actively stolen by cybercriminals and used to conduct criminal activity on-line. ***While there has been no financial loss to the Company, there has been a degradation of the reputation and image of the Company, which is often perceived to be part of the criminal network conducting this cyber-crime.***

Victims of this billion dollar a year industry blame the real institution which is used by criminals to conduct their scams. The online reputations of all institutions have all been jeopardized by these organized gangs of cyber-criminals. The Company is a victim of AFF, but is now taking action to protect itself from such criminal activities and MNC fully intend to pursue these criminals with the assistance of international and local law enforcement authorities.

The initial problem within MNC was to determine which organization would handle these sensitive issues. This problem crosses several key domains; strategic security, fraud, public relations and IT security. As this particular problem does not physically cause any monetary loss, it does not necessarily breach the benchmarks required to fall under the domain of an anti-Fraud organization. For the MNC it was ultimately the Company's Security Unit, which deals with both strategic and physical security; that took on the role of defining the problem and devising solutions. Over the last year our Security Unit has become our subject matter experts on advance fee fraud and has achieved quick results by using the broader definition of "cyber crime" The Company's Security Unit has developed several key programs to combat this criminal activity targeting the Company with three components; EDUCATION, DISRUPTION and PROSECUTION.

EDUCATION

The Intellectual Property Protection initiative is a confidential and sensitive security program designed to provide a long term methodology using Ultrascan focused specifically on protecting the Company from all forms of identity theft and cyber-crime. This is a very specialized domain, and outsourcing several key components of the program to Ultrascan that focus on this issue alone has provided quick results. The first decision was a difficult one; does the Company as an institution want to "come out of the closet" and expose the fact that we have this problem? MNC is in fact the first institution to come forward and admit publicly that this is a problem. In order to increase our global impact in the education domain we joined an alliance

DISRUPTION


This phase of the program consists of an outsourced pro-active Anti corporate identity theft package that focuses on determining the identities, locations and tactics of the key cyber-crime perpetrators using the Company name, logo, trade mark and the names of Company employees. This is being done by cyber-crime specialists of Ultrascan located at a remote site, using an online "filter" system comprised of "points of reception" designed to capture all online activity using the name of the Company. Ultrascan's 419unit

operates from a secure facility that can not be traced back to the MNC. The AFF points of reception are located in 69 countries across the globe and they automatically answer all Company related fraud proposals via email and phone/fax in order to collect more details about the perpetrators behind the proposals. These filters are fine tuned to ensure optimal reception, response and tracking. ***This program has been successful in identifying the “online” identities of the key perpetrators of MNC related cyber-crime and has started to create a “fear factor” which makes cyber-criminals wary of using the Company trademark for criminal activities.***

A recognizable trend is a change in the focal point used by cyber-criminals conducting AFF on two continents. The cyber-criminals are moving away from using the identity of MNC and are now using “a competitor” as their false online identity. Approximately 150 fake websites using the “the competitor brand” were identified.

Since we started the program there has been a significant decrease in the number of AFF online activities using the name of the Company, the official logo of the Company, the name of Company staff members.


The key websites supporting cyber-criminals using the Company were located and shut down, one particular website was operating from Cotonou, Benin with a convincing pirated MNC web site that including a fake board of directors. Ultrascan also shut down multiple false MNC web sites in South Africa. Ultrascan expects that the criminals will re-establish this site again somewhere in West Africa or China, but MNC now have the capability to detect, monitor, disrupt and quickly shut down such activities to ensure they no longer use the identity of the Company.



PROSECUTION

Currently, Ultrascan is simultaneously investigating 8 different AFF scam proposals using the name of the MNC in 8 different countries; Benin, South Africa, Czech, Nigeria, Netherlands, USA, England, and Australia. Ultrascan identifies the perpetrators behind these scams in order to trace and locate the individuals conducting these crimes. Then, Ultrascan collects evidence, which includes registration of conversations, cyber-forensics, and on some occasions meetings with the victims in order to get detailed information on the criminals. This evidence is passed to local authorities as appropriate for further investigation and prosecution. MNC have worked closely with the Nigerian EFCC in this role, however the lack of investigative capacity, laws, and prosecutorial will of many African is a serious problem. Ultrascan intend to assist African law enforcement entities in developing a stronger capacity to fight cyber crime, as we have clearly noted a trend for the criminals to move into countries that have weaker judicial capabilities.

MNC is still in the early stages of this project and will continue to look for partners willing to join us in this endeavour; there remain millions of emails and cyber-scams going out daily using the name of the Company. It is expected that the cyber-criminals will continue to adapt and change their tactics against the MNC; however MNC is now in a position to monitor and exert some measure of control over the criminal use of our trademark, through a proactive program of education, disruption and prosecution.



Appendix E: Corporate Information & Questions

For general questions about 419 Advance Fee Fraud please first take a look at the website of The 419 coalition <http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/index.htm> or Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations <http://www.ultrascan-agi.com>

Please do not call us for information before you have introduced yourself in an email or fax.

Ultrascan AGI
p/a Foundation for Investigation of Cross-border Financial Fraud (FICFF)
AOC Amsterdam
WG Plein 180
1054 SC
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Telephone: +31 20 80 80 335
Email: info@ultrascan-agi.com
Website: <http://www.ultrascan-agi.com>
Twitter: <https://twitter.com/Ultrascan419>
Chamber of Commerce registration 34325169 (FICFF)